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GOVERNANCE MODEL IN EMERGING 
MARKETS THROUGH CORPORATE LAW 
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
 
ABSTRACT  
If we group together corporate governance models in countries 
with emerging markets, it is worthwhile to consider if reform 
suggestions could be offered to these counties collectively to address 
their shared weak points from a legal perspective. This article 
attempts to find common characteristics in corporate governance 
models from countries with emerging markets, who suffer from 
similar problems and challenges. The article traces many 
dimensions through which corporate governance functions in 
emerging markets can be characterized, with an emphasis on the 
legal foundations and responses to problems especially within 
corporate law, in order to promote the soundness of corporate 
governance systems measured according to criteria such as 
accountability, transparency, responsibility, and fairness. Focusing 
on corporate governance problems arising from state ownership, 
state control, board independence, and poor stakeholder and 
minority shareholder protection, several proposals are made at 
different levels. Hybrid regulatory sources from government 
legislation and soft law are suggested as appropriate for emerging 
markets. A series of elements are suggested, although some may 
have already been enforced individually in certain jurisdictions, 
including independent directors, employee representatives, more 
clearly defined directors’ duties, especially their duties toward 
stakeholders, mandatory information disclosure of corporate social 
responsibility (“CSR”) issues, legitimacy of cross-listing, effective 
auditing, and the appointment of independent external auditors in 
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order to promote corporate governance and respond to 
inefficiencies in emerging markets. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Corporate governance has attracted a great deal of attention over the 
past two decades as a global topic, with special attention paid to 
developing countries and emerging markets. This exposure has been 
driven by financial turmoil and corporate scandals, namely the Asian 
financial crisis in the late 1990s, scandals across the United States and 
Europe (including Enron, WorldCom and Ahold), and the recent financial 
crisis of 2008. It is widely accepted that poor governance quality hinders 
economic growth, financial market development, and establishment of a 
sound economic system that fits a jurisdiction. Academic theories 
concerning typical and classic corporate governance can be divided into 
two schools of thought,
1
 centered on the shareholder primacy norm and 
stakeholder theory. These theories are typified by the Anglo-American 
“market orientated” outsider model and the continental European and 
Japanese “network orientated” insider model. Each has characteristic sets 
of structural elements, ownership patterns, and strengths and weaknesses.
2
 
The former is usually characterized by financing though equity, dispersed 
ownership, active markets for corporate control, and flexible labor 
markets.
3
 In contrast, the latter is usually described in terms of long-term 
debt finance, ownership by large blockholders, weak markets for corporate 
control, and rigid labor markets.
4
  
Comparing the “communitarian” and “capitalist” systems, corporate 
governance in emerging markets refers to the systems adopted in countries 
which are rapidly entering the global market. With the globalization of the 
world economy, world trade, and multinational corporations, the 
 
 
 1. There are also academics who divide corporate governance systems into four models, namely 
the outsider system, the Rhineland or insider system, the Latin system and the Japanese system. See 
LUTGART VAN DEN BERGHE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD: CONVERGENCE 
OR DIVERGENCE? A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 1 (2002). Meanwhile, other academics think that, apart 
from the shareholder oriented model, there are also manager-oriented, labor-oriented, and state-
oriented models of corporate law. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for 
Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 443 (2001). 
 2. See Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, An Emerging Third Way? The Erosion of the 
Anglo-American Shareholder Value Construct, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 493, 494 (2005). 
 3. See Ruth V. Aguilera & Gregory Jackson, The Cross-National Diversity of Corporate 
Governance: Dimensions and Determinants, 28 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 447, 447 (2003). 
 4. Id.  
http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol15/iss3/6
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importance of diversity across various corporate governance models is 
becoming increasingly important.
5
 Corporate governance in emerging 
markets is playing, or is going to play, a particularly active role in such a 
diversified context. The jurisdictions which are classified as emerging 
markets go beyond China, Russia, India, and Brazil and are important 
global powers creating economic and political waves on a global scale. 
They include Asian countries such as Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, 
the Philippines, and Malaysia, as well as European countries such as 
Romania, Turkey, Poland, Bulgaria, Russia, and Hungary, and Latin 
American countries such as Argentina, Mexico, and Chile.
6
 It is worth 
pointing out that it is not accurate to equate countries with emerging 
markets to developing countries
7
 because of the rapid economic growth 
which enables countries with emerging markets to provide a focus for 
personal and institutional investors and international corporations—it 
would be equally misleading to judge by relative income per capita.
8
  
It is argued by David Held and Anthony McGrew that “globalization, 
simply put, denotes the expanding scale, growing magnitude, speeding up 
and deepening impact of transcontinental flows and patterns of social 
interaction.”
9
 As for corporate governance and legal transplant,
10
 there is 
no consensus on how globalization will affect legal reform towards global 
standards. For example Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, 
Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny conclude that countries with a 
 
 
 5. See ULRICH BECK, THE COSMOPOLITAN VISION (2006); See also JAGDISH BHAGWATI, IN 
DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION (2004).  
 6. This list was compiled by the International Monetary Fund. See New Setbacks, Further 
Policy Action Needed, INT’L MONETARY FUND (July 16, 2012), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ 
weo/2012/update/02/pdf/0712.pdf, at 3. 
 7. According to the definition provided by the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD hereinafter), developing countries are generally defined as 
those with a per capita income level less than $1000, while those countries having per capita income 
levels between $1,000 and $9,999 are normally defined as emerging economies. Developed or mature 
economics are defined as having a per capita income level greater than $10,000. 
 8. See Chong Ju Choi et al., Global Corporate Governance: Emerging Market and Strategic 
Transparency in a New Triad Framework, 10 ASIA PACIFIC J. ECON. BUS. 48, 50 (2006).  
 9. See DAVID HELD & ANTHONEY MCGREW, GLOBALIZATION/ANTI-GLOBALIZATION: BEYOND 
THE GREAT DIVIDE 1 (2d ed. 2002).  
 10. For discussions and examples of corporate governance transplants, see generally Curtis J. 
Milhaupt, Historical Pathways of Reform: Foreign Law Transplants and Japanese Corporate 
Governance, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CONTEXT (Klaus J. Hopt, Eddy Wymeersch, Hideki 
Kanda & Harald Baum eds., 2005); Mohammad Rizal Salim, Legal Transplantation and Local 
Knowledge: Corporate Governance in Malaysia, 20 AUSTRALIAN J. CORP. L. 55 (2006); Umakanth 
Varottil, A Cautionary Tale of the Transplant Effect on Indian Corporate Governance, 21 NAT’L L. 
SCHOOL OF INDIA REV. 1 (2009); Kaneko Yuka, Theories and Realities of Asian Corporate 
Governance: From “Transplantation” to the Asian Best Practices, 2 PROCEDIA—SOC. & BEHAV. SCI. 
6883 (2010). 
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common law tradition tend to protect investors better than do countries 
with a civil law tradition.
11
 Thomas Clarke and Marie de la Rama argue 
that the European and Asian corporate governance systems will converge 
towards an Anglo-American system with a stronger securities market and 
higher level of disclosure.
12
 Another group of scholars has recognized that 
a “one size fits all” approach will not work because of path dependence 
theory.
13
 Based on such discussions, countries with emerging markets 
should avoid simply copying legislation and code implemented in mature 
markets. The most appropriate and effective regulatory framework will 
greatly depend on how evolved the market and the legal and governmental 
institutions are as well as the history and culture that exist in a specific 
economy,
14
 including the shareholding ownership structure that is unique 
for each nation and brings unique agency problems. The author agrees 
with the argument of Ozden Deniz that “copying code from one country to 
another without analyzing the details of a corporate governance system or 
considering the applicability to a specific country’s judicial system or 
ensuring effective enforcement, will not bring the expected benefit and 
reform to that country.”
15
 The corporate governance models in emerging 
market are still in the developing stage without a certain and clearly 
predictable end as changing and dynamic hybrid models with characters 
from both extreme models, which change in line with economic 
advancement and legal and cultural development. 
The post-crisis research has not placed a great deal of focus on 
emerging markets and even less so on developing countries, and much 
work still refers to situations in developed countries, in particular the 
 
 
 11. See Rafeal La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131, 1132 
(1997). 
 12. See THOMAS CLARKE & MARIE DE LA RAMA, 1 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND 
GLOBALIZATION (2006); see also Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 10, at 469. 
 13. See Anne-Marie Anderson & Parveen P. Gupta, Corporate Governance: Does One Size Fit 
All, 24 J. CORP. ACCT. FIN. 51, 63 (2013); see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of 
Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, in CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 69 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark J. Roe eds., 2004); MARK J. ROE, 
EXPLAINING WESTERN SECURITIES MARKET IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: POLITICAL AND LEGAL 
PERSPECTIVE 279 (Mark J. Roe ed., 2005); Reinhard H. Schmidt & Gerald Spindler, Path Dependence 
and Complementarity in Corporate Governance, in CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 114 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark J. Roe eds., 2004); Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling 
Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating Corporate Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
1641 (2006). 
 14. Katharina Pistor, The Standardization of Law and Its Effect on Developing Economies, 50 
AM. J. COMP. L. 97, 97–130 (2002). 
 15. Ozden Deniz, The Importance of Corporate Governance for a Well-Functioning Financial 
System: Reforming Corporate Governance in Developing Countries and Emerging Market Economies, 
18 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 67, 77 (2012). 
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United States and Europe. Furthermore, research often focuses on the 
relationship between corporate governance and economic development 
and not on regulation or proposals for legal responses. The purpose of this 
article is to fill these gaps. Grouping corporate governance frameworks in 
countries with emerging markets together, it is worthwhile to consider if 
reform suggestions could be offered to these counties collectively to 
address their shared weak points from a legal perspective. This article 
attempts to find common characteristics of corporate governance models 
in countries with emerging markets. This special economic development 
stage means that corporate governance in these counties suffers from 
similar problems and challenges. This article traces many dimensions 
through which corporate governance functions in emerging markets. 
However, the emphasis of the article will be on legal foundations and 
responses to these problems, especially within corporate law, in order to 
promote the soundness of corporate governance systems measured 
according to criteria including accountability, transparency, responsibility, 
and fairness. Therefore, effective corporate governance will lead to greater 
investment, high growth and greater employment creation; lower costs of 
capital and associated higher firm valuations; better allocation of resources 
and better management; lower risk of financial crises; and better 
relationships with all stakeholders.
16
 Current discussions on emerging 
markets tend to distinguish the business model and governance model in 
emerging markets and those in development markets, and there is a lack of 
research on legal responses that could be introduced or improved within 
emerging markets in order to promote the competitiveness of corporate 
governance schemes. This article is an original attempt by linking the 
weaknesses of corporate governance in emerging markets with possible 
regulatory responses from the domain of corporate law and governance 
through a combination of both hard law and soft law.  
The article is structured as follows. It starts with an introduction to 
corporate governance in emerging markets, as that determines the scope of 
the issue in the current economic climate. The article goes on to explore 
the common characteristics of corporate governance in emerging markets, 
and argues for the possible weaknesses and problems of these corporate 
governance models. It does so by proving background on the countries’ 
financial, economic, and institutional environments, including control of 
companies, political or governance interference, board structure and 
 
 
 16. Stijin Claessens & B. Burcin Yurtoglu, Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets: A 
Survey, 15 EMERGING MKTS. REV. 1, 11–12 (2013).  
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performance, ownership patterns and stakeholder protection. After 
analyzing the common problems of corporate governance models in 
emerging markets, some regulatory reform suggestions will be presented 
in order to enhance the corporate governance inefficiencies that exist in 
emerging markets. The author is aware of the limitations of the research, 
mainly stemming from difficulty in generalizing the findings from one 
specific country to the others, since optimal governance likely differs 
between developed and emerging markets as well as between different 
countries with emerging markets.
17
 While selected highly representative 
examples have been given of different countries to identify the 
characteristics of corporate governance in emerging markets, the research 
does have certain limitations in terms of applying the principles and 
arguments non-exceptionally to every single jurisdiction which falls into 
the category of emerging markets.  
II. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN EMERGING MARKETS  
Since the 1990s the number of emerging markets has grown rapidly, 
with the rise of several very large economies such as India and China. 
Emerging markets play an increasingly significant role in the global 
economy. These countries collectively account for nearly 40 percent of 
global gross domestic product (GDP) according to the International 
Monetary Fund, and they are expected to account for nearly 50 percent of 
global GDP growth.
18
 Also it is estimated by the UN Development 
Program that the joint economic output of Brazil, India and China alone is 
expected to exceed the combined production of the United States, Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom.
19
 More and more 
scholars are focusing their research efforts on corporate governance and 
corporate law in emerging markets, and the differences between regulation 
and accountability of companies in emerging markets and those in 
developed markets are becoming a topical issue. These scholars have 
historically been interested in country-specific governance metrics, rather 
than in cross-national studies with a focus on emerging markets. It has 
 
 
 17. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, The Elusive Quest for Global Governance Standards 
157 U. PA. L. REV. 12, 63 (2009); J. Harold Mulherin, Corporations, Collective Action and Corporate 
Governance: One Size Does Not Fit All, 124 PUBLIC CHOICE 179 (2005). 
 18. Ernst & Young, Six Global Trends Shaping the Business World: Emerging Markets Increase 
their Global Power, available at http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Issues/Business-environment/Business-
redefined---Understanding-the-forces-transforming-our-world.  
 19. United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report (2013), at iv, 
available at http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/14/hdr2013_en_complete.pdf. 
http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol15/iss3/6
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been shown in research by the Global Corporate Governance Forum and 
the International Finance Corporation (IFC) that less than 1 percent of the 
available research papers on corporate governance focus on emerging 
markets.
20
 The research on emerging markets seems ever important in 
light of data from the World Economic Outlook, which demonstrate that 
“global growth is projected at 3.3 percent in 2015 with a gradual pickup in 
advanced economies and a slowdown in emerging market and developing 
economies.”21 Existing country-specific research on emerging markets has 
delivered mixed results and inconclusive findings about the relationship 
between corporate governance indicators and corporate performance,
22
 so 
that broader research on emerging markets would seem to be appropriate 
and necessary. Research on emerging markets is challenging, but 
rewarding. The economic crises in Russia, East Asia, and Latin America 
and financial scandals in the United States and Europe have made 
corporate directors and regulators realize that the way of doing business 
has changed in terms of new demands for greater corporate 
accountability.
23
 In achieving these corporate governance goals, efficient 
corporate governance and corporate regulation in emerging markets is an 
area of great research significance.  
The emerging market has always been regarded as a third category that 
is becoming increasingly important from a corporate governance 
perspective. Research and a solid understanding of corporate governance 
in emerging markets will enable multinational companies to secure a 
strong base in these jurisdictions. This strong base will enable these 
corporations and countries to seek growth beyond their domestic spheres 
toward bigger markets with great potential for growth. Stijin Claessens 
and B. Burcin Yurtoglu collected evidence to show that voluntary and 
market corporate governance mechanisms have less effect when a 
country’s governance system is weak, which is normally the case in 
 
 
 20. Melsa Ararat & George Dallas, Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets: Why It Matters 
to Investors—and What They Can Do About It, 4 PRIVATE SECTOR OPINION 22 (2011). 
 21. World Economic Outlook Update: Slower Growth in Emerging Markets, a Gradual Pickup in 
Advanced Economies, INT’L MONETARY FUND, July 9, 2015, available at http://www.imf.org/external/ 
pubs/ft/weo/2015/update/02/pdf/0715.pdf. 
 22. Id.  
 23. Ruth V. Aguilera, Luiz Richardo Kabbach de Castro, Jun Ho Lee & Jihae You, Corporate 
Governance in Emerging Markets, in CAPITALISMS AND CAPITALISM IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
319 (Glenn Morgan & Richard Whitley eds., 2012).. For a discussion on corporate accountability, see 
generally ANDREW KEAY, BOARD ACCOUNTABILITY IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2015). For 
discussions on corporate accountability in emerging markets, for example, in China, see generally 
Andrew Keay & Jingchen Zhao, Ascertaining the Notion of Board Accountability in Chinese Listed 
Companies, Feb. 1, 2015, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2596539 (last visited Mar. 29, 2015). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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countries with emerging markets.
24
 The characteristics of corporate 
governance in an emerging market are closely connected with a wide 
background of economics, as well as the institutional and financial 
environment in that country, including the shareholding structure and 
pattern, which help to determine the nature and scope of the corporate 
governance system.
25
 In comparison with mature markets, in an emerging 
market, the most important corporate governance-related issues are the 
concentrated ownership structure with a state-owned shareholder system,
26
 
institutional shareholder ownership within companies, the degree of access 
to financing, and underdeveloped private financial markets. Corporate 
governance frameworks will differ greatly among countries with emerging 
markets according to variations in different elements within their 
economic framework and other related cultural, traditional, historical, and 
legal factors; for example, there will be many differences between central 
and eastern European countries such as the Czech Republic, and East 
Asian countries such as China. However, research on the collective virtues 
of corporate governance models in these countries will be important to 
discover their common features and similar development goals.  
While international development agencies such as the World Bank are 
persuaded to shift their strategy from the financing of physical 
infrastructure to financing improvements in institutional infrastructure, 
enhancing corporate governance related reform in emerging markets 
becomes an absolute priority, most distinctively the establishment of the 
Global Corporate Governance Forum in 1999 by the World Bank and the 
OECD.
27
 Many jurisdictions within emerging markets have been victims 
 
 
 24. Claessens & Yurtoglu, supra note 112, at 1. 
 25. Id.  
 26. For more discussions of shareholding ownership and corporate governance in emerging 
markets, see Aguilera et al., supra note 126. For more discussions on SOEs and corporate governance, 
see Jiangyu Wang, Political Logic of Corporate Governance in China’s State-Owned Enterprises, 47 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 631 (2014); Daniel D. Sokol, Competition Policy and Comparative Corporate 
Governance of State-Owned Enterprises, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1713 (2009); Guanghua Yu, Using 
Western Law to Improve China’s State-Owned Enterprises: Of Takeovers and Securities Fraud, 39 
VAL. U. L. REV. 339 (2004–2005); Kiarie Mwaura, Failure of Corporate Governance in State Owned 
Enterprises and the Need for Restructured Governance in Fully and Partially Privatized Enterprises: 
The Case of Kenya, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 34 (2007–2008); Aldo Musacchio, Sergio G. Lazzarini & 
Ruth V. Aguilera, New Varieties of State Capitalism: Strategic and Governance Implications, 29 
ACAD. MGMT. PERSPECTIVES 115 (2015). 
 27. Mariana Pargendler, Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets, in OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE (forthcoming, Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 
Oxford Univ. Press). 
http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol15/iss3/6
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of the financial crisis which started in 1997.
28
 During the last two decades, 
the East Asian financial crisis has been one of the reasons for the extensive 
influence of the formalized Western institutional framework in many 
Asian countries, such as South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia. Many 
countries which were badly affected undertook substantial changes in their 
legal and corporate governance systems, and carried out structural reform 
in order to receive assistance from the International Monetary Fund.
29
 The 
OECD White Paper of 2003 was viewed as an ambitious undertaking for a 
region as diverse as Asia, being a collective effort by Asian policymakers, 
regulators, and regional and international experts to reach agreement on 
policy priorities and recommendations with the purpose of improving 
corporate governance.
30
 
Following this White Paper, various documents and further 
publications have been produced by the OECD, including “Implementing 
the White Paper on Corporate Governance in Asia 2006,” “Policy Brief on 
Corporate Governance of Banks in Asia 2006,” “Asia: Overview of 
Corporate Governance Framework 2007,” “Policy Brief on Corporate 
Governance of State-Owned Enterprises in Asia 2010,” “Corporate 
Governance in Asia—Progress and Challenges 2011,” and “Reform 
Priorities in Asia: Taking Corporate Governance to a Higher Level 2012.” 
In terms of corporate governance related regulatory framework reforms, 
different approaches have been adopted in different jurisdictions. These 
range from fundamental changes in law and regulations on capital markets 
to partial changes in specific areas of law.
31
 To complete the regulatory 
framework from a soft law perspective, many countries have adopted 
corporate governance codes. For example, the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission issued its “Code of Corporate Governance for Listed 
 
 
 28. Simon Johnson, Peter Boone, Alasdair Breach & Eric Friedman, Corporate Governance in 
the Asian Financial Crisis, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 141 (2000); Todd Mitton, A Cross-firm Analysis of the 
Impact of Corporate Governance on the East Asian Financial Crisis, 64 J. F FIN. ECON. 215 (2002); 
Michael L. Lemmon & Karl V. Lins, Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance and Firm Value: 
Evidence from the East Asian Financial Crisis, 58 J. CORP. FIN. 1445 (2003). 
 29. Donald J. Johnston, White Paper on Corporate Governance in Asia, OECD, (2003), 
available at http://www.oecd.org/corporate/corporateaffairs/corporategovernanceprinciples/25778905. 
pdf.  
 30. Reform Priorities in Asia: Taking Corporate Governance to a Higher Level 7, OECD (2012), 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/corporateaffairs/corporategovernanceprinciples/49801431.pdf.  
 31. For example, in the case of Korea, reforms have included the amended Part III of the 
Commercial Code, and the amended Securities and Exchange Act, an amended Act on the External 
Audit of Joint Stock Companies and an amended Securities Investment Trust Business Act. For more 
discussion of the case of Korea, see Bernard Black, Corporate Governance in Korea at the 
Millennium: Enhancing International Competitiveness Final Report and Legal Reform 
Recommendations to the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Korea, 26 J. CORP. L. 537, 541 (2001).  
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Companies in China” in January 2001, while the Ministry of Finance and 
Economy started establishing a private sector committee with the purpose 
of improving corporate governance. This committee adopted a non-
binding “Code of Best Practices for Corporate Governance.” In addition, 
the Stock Exchange of Thailand published “The Principle of Good 
Corporate Governance for Listed Companies” in 2006. The Ministry of 
Corporate Affairs introduced its “Corporate Governance Voluntary 
Guidelines” in 2009. The Securities and Exchange Board of India also 
published a “Consultative Paper on Review of Corporate Governance in 
India” in 2013.  
III. COMMON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DEFICIENCIES IN EMERGING 
MARKETS  
In emerging markets, weak laws and inefficient law enforcement fail to 
offer adequate protection to minority shareholders and stakeholders such 
as creditors.
32
 Greater protection cannot be offered to investors and 
stakeholders without enhancing the enforcement and implantation of 
highly developed regulations or adopting the best practice standards from 
the experience of developed markets. Research on better regulatory 
frameworks would seem to be important in order to establish a better 
understanding for investors and build more organized relationships 
between stakeholders and companies. This would help achieve higher 
valuations and improve performance for companies, thereby enhancing 
business prosperity and corporate accountability. Furthermore, it will be 
important for companies registered in a jurisdiction with an emerging 
market, weak legal regimes, thin bond markets and imperfect bank 
financing systems, to attract investment through a stronger and more 
accountable corporate governance framework. Similarly, increasing 
accountability in the corporate governance framework is critical to 
develop systems in emerging markets and evolve them into more mature 
forms.
33
 
Country-specific research on corporate governance within the domain 
of emerging markets has delivered mixed results that suggest that 
empirical evidence on the relationship between corporate governance and 
the performance of companies in emerging markets is inconclusive.
34
 
However, this part is going to explore the common characteristics and 
 
 
 32. Claessens & Yurtoglu, supra note 112, at 1. 
 33. Ju Choi, supra note 82, at 50. 
 34. Ararat & Dallas, supra note 121, at 4. 
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problems of corporate governance related issues in countries with 
emerging markets. Comparative studies between corporate governance 
systems in emerging markets, and those in mature markets will be studied 
as case studies. In order to maintain the legitimacy of the governance 
process, the realization of accountability within corporate governance 
seems to be more difficult to achieve in a context of government 
interference and immature markets. Especially after the financial crisis of 
2008, there is a strong trend in favor of arguing that corporate governance 
will produce a more efficient market-based investment processes and 
establish better relationships between companies and their stakeholders, 
including shareholders.
35
 Conversely, the financial turmoil has reinforced 
how failures in corporate governance can have a tremendous negative 
impact on companies’ performance and adversely affect national 
economies as a whole.  
A. Government and Political Intervention and Dominance of SOEs 
In the liberal political economy proposed by Adam Smith in his 
milestone work The Wealth of Nations,
36
 the government monitors and 
enforces the regulatory environment in which companies compete for 
profit, but the government should not be directly involved in a company’s 
decisions and transactions. Since then, many reasons have been advanced 
arguing that state control over commercial transactions will lead to the 
failure of the business organization. It is argued that based on the 
efficiency of the corporate form, direct involvement of state officials will 
impose multiple political interests on companies, which will dilute 
motives when social objectives collide with shareholders’ wealth 
maximization. It is also argued that informational asymmetry and 
uncertainty will constrain the effectiveness of coordination and 
interference from governments. The willingness of governments to share 
risk might weaken the motives of companies in making more profit and 
lead to soft budget constraints, with negative effects on the firm’s 
 
 
 35. John C. Coffee, What Went Wrong? An Initial Inquiry into the Causes of the 2008 Financial 
Crisis, 9 J. CORP. L. STUD. 1 (2009); Emilios Avgouleas, The Global Financial Crisis, Behavioural 
Finance and Financial Regulation: In Search of a New Orthodoxy, 9 J. CORP. L. STUD. 23 (2009); 
Chris Gentle, Work in Progress? How the Credit Crunch has its Roots in the Lack of Integrated 
Governance and Control Systems, 9 J. RISK FIN. 206 (2008); The Association of Chartered Certified 
Accountants, Climbing Out of the Credit Crunch, ACCA POLICY PAPER 4 (2008); Cary Krosinsky, 
Nick Robins & Stephen Viederman, After the Credit Crunch: The Future of Sustainable Investing, in 
ADVANCES IN BUSINESS ETHICS RESEARCH 9 (T. Hebb ed., 2012). 
 36. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 
(1776). 
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efficiency. Taking China as an example, the corporate governance policy 
model in China builds on a strong authoritarian national leadership and an 
elite state bureaucracy pursuing developmentally oriented policies, 
including the direct means of governing the market.
37
 The economic 
success in the last two decades is the result of combative policies, 
sometimes even contradicting government control and interference—
including liberalization of the product and labor markets, entering the 
WTO and opening to free trade, and corporatization. On the route to 
success, these factors that seemingly contradict administrative factors may 
hinder the development of corporate governance and be regarded as 
barriers which limit further improvement of corporate governance in 
China. One of the main Chinese corporate governance paradoxes at the 
current stage lies in the conflicting roles of the government, between 
establishing a functional corporate governance environment to support the 
market economy with the Chinese characteristics, and incomparable, 
arbitrary, and politically motivated government control. However, the 
effectiveness and necessity of government interference in business 
organizations have been questioned and discussed in various dimensions, 
especially after the financial crisis of 2008. Instead of having a direct role 
in facilitating and shaping dynamic growth, the state’s ability to create and 
maintain a supportive growth climate is key for emerging markets to 
achieve economic miracles.
38
 Within government capacity limitations, 
government interference enable the expansion of production and 
unstainable corporate strategic development. It has also laid the foundation 
for government supervision in order to mitigate the problems resulting 
from unstable financial and stock markets in emerging markets. 
Government interference could be used as an additional governance 
mechanism to mitigate conflicts such as those in the cases of company 
expansion across community boundaries, secondary policers of public 
procurement, and redundancies and reemployment to secured boarder 
social consensus. 
Sir Roger Carr, president of the Confederation of British Industry 
(“CBI”), put forward three reasons for failures in the development of 
governance, including the excessive concentration of power, a lack of 
 
 
 37. ROBERT WADE, GOVERNING THE MARKET: ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE ROLE OF 
GOVERNMENT IN EASE ASIAN INDUSTRIALIZATION 26 (1990). 
 38. Guido Bertucci & Adriana Alberti, Globalization and the Role of the State: Challenges and 
Perspectives, UNITED NATIONS WORLD PUBLIC SECTOR REPORT 1, 16 (2001) (Paper is based on 
United Nations World Public Sector Report 2001 on “Globalization and the State” in which authors 
were major contributors). 
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transparency in reporting, and a plain lack of interest by the owners.
39
 The 
state-controlled shareholders exercise influence through regular statutory 
voting rights in the shareholders’ meeting and explicit control-sharing 
arrangements as parties to shareholder agreements. This will grant these 
investors both board representation and veto rights over important 
decisions. In emerging markets with low quality governments, companies 
will likely have different financing and governance patterns while 
bureaucrats and politicians take advantage of their position for self-interest 
and corruption.
40
 It is argued by Mara Faccio that political connections are 
normally more frequently found in countries with higher levels of 
corruption, more barriers to foreign investment, and less transparent 
systems.
41
 Comparing these with countries with developed markets and 
low government intervention, investors in emerging markets are always 
very concerned about political and policy risks that include discriminatory 
changes to the laws, regulations, or contracts governing an investment, tax 
increases, loss of subsidies, changes of market policy, breaches of 
contract, the inability to control inflation, and laws regarding resource 
extraction.
42
 Yadong Luo defined political risk as the probability of 
disruption of the operation of Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) by 
political forces of events, whether they happen in the host or home 
country, or result from changes in international environment.
43
 Based on 
this definition, political risks normally include currency convertibility and 
transfer, expropriation, political voice, breach of contract by a host 
government, and the non-honoring of sovereign financial obligations.
44
  
Politics, law, and economics have been identified within comparative 
corporate governance research as the main factors triggering different 
 
 
 39. Sir Roger Carr, CBI President, Speech to YouGov Cambridge Symposium: Will Coalition 
Plan for Shareholder Empowerment Make Any Difference to Either Corporate Excess or Economic 
Growth? (Mar. 15, 2012). 
 40. Joseph P.H. Fan, K.C. John Wei, & Xinzhong Xu, Corporate Finance and Governance in 
Emerging Markets: A Selective Review and An Agenda for Future Research, 17 J. CORP. FIN. 207, 209 
(2011).  
 41. Mara Faccio, Politically Connected Firms, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 369 (2006); see also Mara 
Faccio, Ronald W. Masulis & John J. McConnell, Political Connections and Corporate Bailouts, 61 J. 
FIN. 1 (2006). 
 42. Witold J. Henisz & Bennet A. Zelner, The Hidden Risks in Emerging Markets, HARV. BUS. 
REV. (Apr. 2010); see also MULTILATERAL INV. GUARANTEE AGENCY, WORLD INVESTMENT AND 
POLITICAL RISK 1 (World Bank ed., 2010). 
 43. Yadong Luo, Political Risk and Country Risk in International Business: Concepts and 
Measures, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 740 (Alan M. Rugman ed., 2d 
ed. 2010). 
 44. Id. 
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ownership patterns across countries.
45
 State share ownerships are more 
popular in countries with emerging markets. Governments often put 
restrictions on transferring corporate ownership to the private sector in 
emerging markets.
46
 Research by the OECD on the 2000 largest 
companies suggested that one tenth of the companies were identified as 
majority SOEs in the business year 2010–2012, with ownership spread 
across thirty-seven countries including China, India, Russia, Brazil, 
Indonesia, the United Arab Emirates, Malaysia, Thailand and South 
Africa.
47
 It is argued that SOEs always have non-commercial priorities, so 
they can act on the basis of commercial considerations for the interests of 
shareholders. In contrast to the dispersed shareholding ownership structure 
of companies in the US and the UK, the emerging markets boast a system 
of state shareholding ownership (or sometimes wealthy family ownership), 
which is one of the common characteristics for countries with emerging 
markets. It is unavoidable that the incentives and professionalism of these 
government officials will be doubtful.  
In countries with emerging markets, the incentives and the quality of 
government officials and regulators are key determinants of corporate 
behavior.
48
 Groups who have controlling powers over corporate resources 
always have political power and affect the level of investor protection, 
mostly in an unfair manner. For example, controlling shareholders prefer 
legislation and rules that will put minority shareholders in a disadvantaged 
position. In the case of China, despite the fact that listed private companies 
outnumbered SOEs in 2014 (986 of the listed companies were SOEs while 
the remaining 1,410 were private companies listed on the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock exchanges), SOEs still control $2.43 trillion of market 
capitalization while private listed companies only control $1.32 trillion.
49
 
Despite the wave of privatzsation in the 1980s and 1990s across countries 
with emerging markets, all of the BRIC counties still show a high level of 
state ownership and companies under direct government control with 60 
 
 
 45. See Michel Goyer, Corporate Governance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS 423 (Glenn Morgan, John Campbell, Colin Crouch, Ove Kai Pedersen, & Richard Whitley 
eds., 2010); Ruth V. Aguilera & Gregory Jackson, The Cross-National Diversity of Corporate 
Governance: Dimensions and Determinants, 28 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 447 (2003). 
 46. Joseph P.H. Fan, K.C. John Wei, & Xinzhong Xu, Corporate Finance and Governance in 
Emerging Markets: A Selective Review and an Agenda for Future Research, 17 J. CORP. FIN. 207, 209 
(2011). 
 47. Przemyslaw Kowalski, Max Büge, Monika Sztajerowska & Matias Egeland, State-Owned 
Enterprises: Trade Effects and Policy Implications, OECD TRADE POLICY PAPERS (2013), available 
at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k4869ckqk7l-en. 
 48. Ararat & Dallas, supra note 121, at 6. 
 49. China Securities Index Co. Ltd., THOMSON REUTERS EIKON. 
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percent of the market capitalization in Russia and 35 percent in Brazil.
50
 
This reaffirmed a major concern of corporate governance in listed 
companies in emerging economies, namely controlling-shareholder 
expropriation or principal-principal conflict, where controlling 
shareholders pursue their self-interest at the expense of corporate 
performance and the interests of minority shareholders.
51
 SOEs play an 
important role in the Chinese economy to achieve the dual goals of 
shareholder profit maximization and the promotion of national interests. 
However, it is argued by Wang that SOEs in China still suffer from 
governance flaws despite the reforms introduced since the 1990s 
addressing conflicts of interests within SOEs, tightening supervision over 
the state agency that controls them, the lack of independence of boards as 
well as the fairness and effectiveness of the board, and the enhancement of 
more transparent financial reports.
52
  
State interference also can be observed from the perspective of 
immature financial markets. It is argued that “advanced countries have 
much deeper financial systems, with ratios more than double those of 
emerging markets and almost three times those of transition economies.”
53
 
Many governments in emerging markets control and influence banks and 
allocate financial resources based on strategic criteria rather than market 
rules and market forces.
54
 Taking China as an example, the Big Four state-
owned banks that comprise the first tier of the banking system in China
55
 
are well known for their unbalanced allocation of financial resources to 
SOEs and private sectors and other listed companies.
56
 The under-
developed regulatory framework composed of banking law, company law, 
and insolvency law (bankruptcy law) also makes it hard to protect 
investors’ and creditors’ rights with the high cost of raising capital. This is 
also the case in India, where the SBI is by far the largest bank in India 
 
 
 50. The Company that Ruled the Waves, ECONOMIST, Dec. 17, 2011, at 109, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/21541753.  
 51. Yiyi Su, Dean Xu & Phillip H. Phan, Principal-Principal Conflict in the Governance of the 
Chinese Public Corporation, 4 MGMT. & ORG. REV. 17 (2007); see also Michael N. Young, Mike W. 
Peng, David Ahlstrom, Garry D. Bruton & Yi Jiang, Corporate Governance in Emerging Economies: 
A Review of the Principal-Principal Perspective, 45 J. MGMT. STUD. 196 (2008).  
 52. Zahofeng Wang, Corporate Governance under State Control: The Chinese Experience, 13 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 487 (2012).  
 53. Claessens & Yurtoglu, supra note 112, at 9. 
 54. Rafael La Porta et al., Government Ownership of Banks, 57 J. FIN. 265 (2002). 
 55. Together twelve national-level domestic joint-equity banks form the second tier, and just one 
hundred city-level commercial banks form the third tier. 
 56. Franklin Allen, Jun Qian & Mejun Qian, Law, Finance, and Economic Growth in China, 77 
J. FIN. & ECON. 57 (2005). 
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with more than 21,500 branches in the SBI group, including five associate 
banks. The banks are not only aiming for profit maximization, but more 
importantly for public services.  
It is stated by the Planning Commission’s Raghuram Rajan Report that 
“public sector entities do exactly what private sectors entities do, through 
less well because they have more constraints, a poorer skill pool and 
poorer incentives.”
57
 The report also suggests that privatization is the way 
forward, and “one way is bank privatization, or reducing the government’s 
majority stake so that even if the government has de facto control, the 
bank is not ‘public sector.’”
58
 The underdeveloped financial markets in 
emerging economies make it difficult for companies to maintain efficient 
and balanced access to external capital, debt, and equity. The financial 
crisis of 2008 highlighted the necessity for strengthening financial systems 
to ensure they are more resilient to shock, especially for emerging markets 
that face particular challenges in stabilizing their nascent financial 
systems, both domestically and externally. Financial reforms are therefore 
key to these economies in order to “pursue high-growth paths.”
59
 Besides, 
overly-heavy reliance on informal mechanisms such as building 
relationships with bankers and government officers who are in control of 
the state-owned banks will generate opportunities for corruption and 
illegal sources of external financial influence.  
B. Improved by Still Worrying Stakeholder Protection and CSR Records 
The concept of stakeholders may be defined as “those groups without 
whose support the organisation would cease to exist.”
60
 They have 
legitimate interests in or claims on the operations of the firm.
61
 These 
stakeholders are interrelated, and every company has a unique set of 
stakeholder groups. However, the groups which are most frequently seen 
as such are employees, customers, creditors, local communities, the 
 
 
 57. INDIA PLANNING COMM’N, HUNDRED SMALL STEPS: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON 
FINANCIAL SECTOR REFORM 78 (2009), available at http://planningcommission.nic.in/reports/ 
genrep/rep_fr/cfsr_all.pdf; see also Rajesh Chakrabarti, State Bank of India: The Opportunities and 
Challenges of Being a State-Owned Bank of India, in POLITICAL ECONOMY OF STATE-OWNED 
ENTERPRISES IN CHINA AND INDIA 247 (Yi-chong Xu ed., 2012). 
 58. See INDIA PLANNING COMM’N, supra note 57, at 78. 
 59. Masahiro Kawai & Eswar S. Prasad, Introduction to FINANCIAL MARKET REGULATION AND 
REFORMS IN EMERGING MARKETS vii (Masahiro Kawai & Eswar S. Prasad eds., 2011). 
 60. R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH 31–32 (1st 
ed. 1984). 
 61. ARCHIE B. CARROLL & ANN BUCHHOLTZ, BUSINESS & SOCIETY: ETHICS AND 
STAKEHOLDER MANAGEMENT 57 (7th ed. 1989). 
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environment, government, and society or the public at large. 
Contemporary stakeholder approach arguments have always been 
paralleled by the emergence of the global CSR movement.
62
 According to 
stakeholder theory, the directors are required to consider the interests of 
the company’s stakeholders apart from the interests of the company 
shareholders. The directors must manage the corporation not only for the 
betterment of the shareholders, but also for the interests of a multitude of 
stakeholders, clearly including the shareholders, who can affect or be 
affected by the actions of the company.
63
 It is argued that a consideration 
of stakeholders’ interests enables the creation of long-term favourable 
conditions for the company to be more competitive. It is useful to regard 
“the company” as “the company as a whole,” a coherent body in which the 
various stakeholders are bound together through the business.
64
 “The 
evolution of CSR theory provides a sort of social responsibily and 
performance paradigm, that is, in essence, a solid foundation for corporate 
social management and stakeholder engagement.”
65
 Very early 
discussions of the CSR concept suggested that CSR is about attending to 
stakeholder rights and taking proactive, voluntary steps to avoid harm or 
damaging consequences for stakeholders.
66
 CSR theory suggests that 
corporations should recognize obligations beyond their shareholders, 
based on the stakeholder theory. Even though the world has witnessed 
economic growth in the 2000s, ameliorating social considerations for 
poverty, inequality, and human rights violations remain a major challenge 
in emerging market economies.  
Compared with developed countries, in countries with emerging 
markets, multinational and domestic companies always suffer more from 
social and environmental problems. These problems include workplace 
issues, such as labor standards, marketplace issues—most notably in 
emerging markets these concern the integrity and quality of products being 
manufactured—and environment issues to promote the sustainability of 
 
 
 62. Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, An Emerging Third Way? The Erosion of the Anglo-
American Shareholder Value Construct, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 493, 494 (2005). 
 63. R. EDWARD FREEMAN, A Stakeholder Theory of the Modern Corporation, in ETHICAL 
THEORY AND BUSINESS 69 (Tom L. Beauchamp & Norman L. Bowie eds., 5th ed. 1997). 
 64. John Parkinson, Reforming Directors’ Duties, 12 POL’Y PAPER (Univ. of Sheffield 1998). 
 65. Robin T. Byerly, Seeking Global Solutions for the Common Good: A New World Order and 
Corporate Social Responsibilities in CORP. SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, ACCOUNTABILITY AND 
GOVERNANCE: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 122 (Istemi Demirag ed., 2005). 
 66. See the initial argument for CSR in HOWARD R. BROWN, SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE 
BUSINESSMAN (Harper & Row 1953); see also Archie B. Carroll, The Pyramid of Social 
Responsibility: Towards the Moral Management of Organizational Stakeholders, 34 BUS. HORIZONS 
39, 39–48 (1991). 
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the companies.
67
 In the case of multinational companies, the massive shift 
in manufacturing capacity from Western economies to countries with 
emerging markets, which offer access to cheaper labor, will not only 
create jobs in local communities in developing countries but also cause 
serious employment problems for unskilled workers in more advanced 
economies.
68
 However, this transition may also create social problems 
concerning employment in developing countries. For example, in the 
Bhopal incident, 20,000 local employees and local residents were killed or 
harmed by a chemical leak from an American-owned chemical factory in 
the city.
69
 The leak could have been prevented if procedures, management, 
and maintenance had been more rigorous. A second example is the use of 
child labor by multinational companies in their factories in the Third 
World, in order to facilitate cheap production of the products they sell in 
Western markets
 
. This issue became an international scandal in the 1990s 
and the first decade of the new millennium.
70
 Therefore, the development 
of a systematic framework of employment law, consumer protection law, 
environmental law, and insolvency law, as well as the protection of the 
basic rights of stakeholders in order to secure the health and safety of the 
employees and customers, are key in emerging markets. 
Exploring and applying the stakeholder theory in emerging markets is 
regarded as one of the most current and challenging debates on corporate 
morality.
71
 Characterized as ‘‘low-income, rapid-growth countries using 
 
 
 67. Feng Zhang, Corporate Social Responsibility in Emerging Market: The Role of Multinational 
Corporations 4 (2008), available at http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/919.pdf.  
 68. PHILIP SADLER, BUILDING TOMORROW’S COMPANY: A GUIDE TO SUSTAINABLE BUSINESS 
19 (Kogan Page 2002). 
 69. See generally INGRID ECKEMAN, THE BHOPAL SAGA (Univ. Press 2004); see also Bhopal 
Gas Tragedy: Fact Sheet, HINDUSTAN TIMES (Dec 3, 2004); Steven R. Weisman, Bhopal Factory a 
Year Later: Silence and Weeds, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 1985), available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
1985/12/02/world/bhopal-factory-a-year-later-silence-and-weeds.html. 
 70. COLIN FISHER & ALAN LOVELL, BUSINESS ETHICS AND VALUE: INDIVIDUAL, CORPORATE 
AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 53 (2d ed. 2006). 
 71. Loke Min Foo, Stakeholder Engagement in Emerging Economies: Considering the Strategic 
Benefits of Stakeholder Management in a Cross-Culture and Geopolitical Context, 7 CORP. 
GOVERNANCE 379 (2007). The protection of stakeholders and possibilities of adopting stakeholder 
theory within the company law and corporate governance code have been very challenging and current 
issues. For discussions on stakeholder theory, see generally R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC 
MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH, (1984); ABBASS F. ALKHAFAJI, A STAKEHOLDER 
APPROACH TO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: MANAGING IN A DYNAMIC ENVIRONMENT (1989); JAMES J. 
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17 INT’L TRADE & BUS. L. REV. 1 (2014); Timothy L Fort, Corporation as Mediating Institution: An 
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economic liberalization as their primary engine of growth,’’
72
 market 
activities in countries with emerging markets have long been 
“characterized by the prevalence of relationship-based or relationship-
governed behaviors”
73
 rather than a rule-governed approach. At the 
institutional level, emerging markets are less developed in terms of their 
formal rules, demonstrating onlyinformal constraints by building informal 
networks or relationships with stakeholders
74
 to win trust and loyalty and 
establish greater levels of respected stakeholder engagement. The 
protection of stakeholders’ and corporations’ responsibilities should go 
beyond the explicit legal and regulatory requirements toward practices that 
are more culturally and traditionally oriented. Reputable relationships with 
stakeholders are also regarded as important factors and are associated with 
better performance in countries with emerging markets, such as 
Thailand.
75
 With increasingly worrying CSR records in emerging markets 
and corporate scandals relating to various socially or environmentally 
irresponsible corporate behaviors, it is logical to think that legal 
constraints on stakeholder protection, especially corporate law related to 
directors’ duties and information disclosure, seem more effective in 
countries with emerging markets. Furthermore, the relationships built with 
guanxi or renqing are quite often related to bribery and corruption because 
of the owners’ ability to seek rent from the government.
76
 As argued in 
 
 
Corporate Governance: A Comparative Analysis, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 309 (2011); Andrew Keay, 
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 72. Robert E. Hoskisson, Lorraine Eden, Chung Ming Lau & Mike Wright, Strategy in Emerging 
Economies, 43 ACAD. MGMT. J. 249 (2000). 
 73. Foo, supra note 71, at 383. 
 74. Raymond Fisman, Estimating the Value of Political Connection, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1095 
(2001). 
 75. Steven White, Stakeholders, Structure and the Failure of Corporate Governance Reform 
Initiatives in Post-Crisis Thailand, 21 ASIA PAC. J. MGMT. 103 (2004). 
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transaction costs, operational uncertainty, information costs, contextual hazards and competitive 
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Part III.A above, many banks in emerging markets are state-owned and the 
government has direct controlling power through civil servants. It is 
reported that state banks frequently give loans and other business 
privileges to those who bribe or build guanxi with the bureaucrats who are 
in charge of the financial services of the country.
77
  
Interesting examples of legal reform of CSR and corporate law have 
been the approaches adopted by the Indian Companies Act 2013 and 
Indonesian legislation. The legislative recognition of CSR in Mauritius 
and India is more advanced than in most Western countries because of 
codifying CSR spending for targeted companies. CSR law in both 
jurisdictions recognized the potential for using corporate strength to fulfil 
the social objectives of the state. According to the Indian Companies Act 
2013, a company having a net worth of five hundred crore or more rupees, 
a turnover of one thousand crore or more rupees or a net profit of five 
crore rupees or more during any financial year should constitute a 
Corporate Social Responsibility Committee of the Board, consisting of 
three or more directors out of which at least one shall be an independent 
director, to play the function of formulating and recommending a CSR 
policy to the board, recommending the amount of expenditure to be 
incurred on CSR activities as specified in Schedule VII and monitor the 
CSR policy of the company from time to time.
78
 Furthermore, the 
mandatory CSR requirement is quantitative by requiring that the company 
 
 
threats. Other benefits include enhancing institutional support, economic returns, business 
effectiveness, organizational legitimacy and strategic capability, in order to provide more efficient 
mechanisms for transactions by acting as the catalyst for the development of new market channels and 
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Tunneling Through Intercorporate Loans: The Chinese Experience, 98 J. FIN. ECON. 1 (2010); J.P.H. 
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spends, in every financial year, at least 2% of the average net profits of the 
company made during the three immediately preceding financial years, in 
pursuance of its Corporate Social Responsibility Policy.
79
 A quantitative 
requirement is a mandatory regulation that requires corporations to 
sacrifice a certain percentage of their corporate profit for the purposes of 
CSR. The obvious advantage of a quantitative requirement is guaranteed 
compliance with substantial and measurable contributions from 
corporations in using a slice of their profit for CSR-related actions. It 
unifies and codifies a common minimum for companies to initiate CSR 
activities and maintain them at an adequate level. One arguable advantage 
of a percentage requirement within corporate law is that it may lead to a 
significant increase in the number of CSR activities. It is important to 
discuss the nature of CSR in these two jurisdictions to assess the 
effectiveness of their CSR legislation, considering how likely these 
legislations are to promote sustainable decision making. Ariya Majumdar 
argued that the new legislation embedded in Companies Act 2013 did not 
reflect the intent and spirit of CSR, which is including CSR in the core 
strategies of the company.
80
 It has been suggested that CSR in India “has 
traditionally been seen as a philanthropic activity as those that were 
performed but not deliberated,”81 and the practice of CSR in India still 
remains within the philanthropic space. As such, CSR may not internalize 
socially responsible behaviors.
82
 This slows the development of CSR in 
India, although it is argued that contemporary CSR tends to effect 
community development through various projects, becoming more 
strategic in nature from the stakeholder perspective.
83
  
Indonesia is quite advanced in terms of CSR for a country with an 
emerging market. Indonesian company law accommodates CSR in its 
company law legislation in its Limited Companies Act 2007, which 
defines how companies should incorporate CSR principles in their internal 
regulation. The introduction of mandatory CSR in Indonesia is a good 
example of implementing corporate social responsibility by the means of 
administrative power. This legislation, with a focus on companies in 
 
 
 79. Id. § 135(5). 
 80. Arjya B. Majumdar, India’s Journey with Corporate Social Responsibility: What Next, 33 
J.L. & COM. 165, 204 (2014–2015). 
 81. Anupam Singh & Priyanka Verma, From Philanthropy to Mandatory CSR: A Journey 
Toward Mandatory Corporate Social Responsibility in India, 6 EUR. J. BUS. MGMT. 146, 147 (2014). 
 82. Rhys Jenkins, Globalisation, Corporate Social Responsibility and Poverty, 81 INT’L AFFAIRS 
525 (2005). 
 83. Jorge A. Arevalo & Deepa Aravind, Corporate Social Responsibility Practices in India: 
Approach, Drivers and Barriers, 11 CORP. GOV.: INT’L J. BUS. SOC’Y 399 (2011). 
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relation to natural resources, is regarded as legislative action that prevents 
company behavior that is irresponsible towards society in order to promote 
the implantation of good corporate governance. The adoption of No. 40 
from the 2007 Companies Act has created significant debate over the 
nature of CSR, while business interests represented by the Indonesian 
Chamber of Commerce and several corporations brought a case before the 
Constitutional Court questioning the legitimacy of Article 74. It is argued 
that the article violated the Indonesian Constitution with respect to Article 
28 D (1) on legal certainty, Article 28 I (2) on discrimination and Article 
33 (4) on the efficiency of economic justice. This is always a problem 
because of the emphasis on voluntary CSR; it may be seen as unjust and 
discriminatory toward certain companies by creating additional burdens 
for them.
84
 In the opinion of the author, two positive aspects of Article 74 
of the New Company Law of the Republic of Indonesia are worth 
considering in relation to Chinese Company Law. First, it might be helpful 
to require companies to include the cost of executing CSR in their 
corporate budgets in future company law or other related legislations, in 
order to strengthen idea of CSR in the minds of corporate directors. 
Second, it is important for certain categories of industries to undertake 
additional social and environmental responsibilities 
C. Board Independence  
In emerging markets, where external governance is comparatively 
weak for a competitive and efficient corporate governance mechanism, the 
capacity of boards to monitor and direct the company as the agent on 
behalf of shareholders is particularly important. Board independence has 
been the topic for a number of corporate governance codes.
85
 The issue 
has been particularly important for emerging markets because of their 
unique agency problems. Agency problems normally arise from two 
scenarios including the principal-agent problem and the principal-principal 
 
 
 84.  ‘Judicial Review of 2008 Laws No. 40’ (2009) Judgment, Case No. 53/PUU-VI/2008, 
Indonesian Constitution Court; see also Patricia Rinwigati Waagstein, The Mandatory Corporate 
Social Responsibility in Indonesia: Problems and Implications, 98 J. BUS. ETHICS 455 (2011). 
 85. See Patricia Rinwigati Waagstein, The Mandatory Corporate Social Responsibility in 
Indonesia: Problems and Implications, 98 J. BUS. ETHICS 455 (2011). 
 85. Alessandro Zattoni & Francesca Cuomo, How Independent, Competent and Incentivized 
Should Non-Executive Directors Be? An Empirical Investigation of Good Governance Codes, 21 BRIT. 
J. MGMT. 63 (2010); see also Ruth V. Aguilera, Corporate Governance and Director Accountability: 
An Institutional Comparative Perspective, 16 BRIT. J. MGMT. 38 (2005); Catherine M. Dalton & Dan 
R. Dalton, Boards of Directors: Utilizing Empirical Evidence in Developing Practical Prescription, 16 
BRIT. J. MGMT. 91 (2005). 
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problem, characterized by the separation of ownership and control or 
conflicts of interest between controlling and non-controlling 
shareholders.
86
 State shareholding and the identity of directors as civil 
servants make both agency problems more significant than in mature 
markets. Apart from the problems coming from ownership, the controlling 
power of the state and the relationship between directors and controlling 
shareholders also make agency problems in emerging markets more 
significant due to economic the market’s development stage, corruption 
and legal enforcement.  
From relevant recommendations in the codes of China, Brazil, India 
and Russia, a group of countries which are at a similar stage of economic 
development with emerging markets, the independence of boards has been 
suggested in various measures, including the introduction of non-executive 
or independent directors.
87
 These are particularly “valuable in emerging 
economies because institutional and market forces are too weak to regulate 
governance matters.”
88
 The existing empirical evidence delivers limited 
and mixed results on the relationship between independent directors and 
the performance of corporations in emerging markets.
89
 However, one 
possible explanation of these mixed results is that the research depends on 
the presumption that independent directors are not independent enough, or 
are not really independent of shareholders’ control.
90
  
An interesting example of legal reform for board independency has 
been the approach adopted by the Indian Companies Act of 2013. 
Independent directors were defined and described in Section 149 (6); it is 
 
 
 86. See Josh Bendickson, Jeff Muldoon, Eric Liguori, Phillip E. Davis, Agency Theory: The 
Times, They Are A-Changin’, 54 MGMT. DECISION 174 (2016). 
 87. CODE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR LISTED COMPANIES IN CHINA, at 46, 49–51 (Jan. 7, 
2001); IGBC, CODE OF BEST PRACTICE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE at 2.21–2.22 (2004); India 
Corporate Week, Corporate Governance Voluntary Guidelines at A.1 (Dec. 2009); CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE CODE (Russ.), at 2.2 (2002).  
 88. Alessandro Zattoni & Francesca Cuomo, supra note 85, at 71. 
 89. For examples of positive results, see, e.g., Fernando Lefort & Francisco Urzua, Board 
Independence, Firm Independence, Firm Performance and Ownership Concentration: Evidence from 
Chile, 61 J. BUS. RES. 615 (2008); Mike W. Peng, Outside Directors and Firm Performance During 
Institutional Transitions, 25 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 453 (2004); Bernard S. Black et al., Does Corporate 
Governance Predict Firm’s Market Values? Evidence from Korea, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 36 (2006); 
but see Yenpao Chen at al., Is China’s Independent Director System Working? The Case of the 
Electronics Industry, 38 J. ECON. STUD. 360 (2011); Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard S. Black, The Non-
Correlation Between Board Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231 
(2002); Melsa Ararat et al., The Effects of Board Independence in Controlled Firms: Evidence from 
Turkey, Working Paper (2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1663403. 
 90. For a comprehensive discussion of shareholder control and independence of board decisions, 
see generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, The Elusive Quest for Global Governance 
Standards, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1263 (2009). 
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stated in the Act that all listed companies and companies notified by 
Central Government must have at least a third of the board made up of 
independent directors,
91
 although there was no requirement to have 
independent directors under the Indian Companies Act 1956 of India. 
However, under the Listing Agreement, the board’s listed entities, 
including the non-executive chairman and the executive chairman, should 
include at least one third to one half of the total directors as independent 
directors, depending on the executive or non-executive nature of the 
chairman. Despite the fact the new law strives to create better norms for 
corporate governance, the change has not brought any positive effects for 
board independence in India, a country with an emerging market.
92
 
Furthermore, one of the independent directors should sit on a Corporate 
Social Responsibility Committee of the Board to make independent 
decisions about CSR-related issues for companies having a net worth of 
five hundred crore rupees or more, a turnover of one thousand crore rupees 
or more, or a net profit of five crore rupees or more during any financial 
year. Disregarding the enforcement of these proposed legislative reforms, 
these approaches have been taken by legislators to deal with some 
fundamental problems in emerging markets, including board independence 
and worrying CSR performance, to promote corporate accountability and a 
healthy investment environment. These are positive attempts in promoting 
stakeholder protection by making CSR mandatory. However, the 
enforcement of these provisions remains problematic and subject to many 
problems, such as corruption.  
IV. PROMOTING MORE EFFICIENT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS IN 
EMERGING MARKETS 
Emerging market countries are going through a hard process of 
transformation in which corporate governance can play a vital role.
93
 
Research on emerging markets becomes very important due to their 
purchasing power. It is reported that the BRIC countries have contributed 
36 percent of the world GDP growth in purchasing power parity terms 
from 2000 to 2010, and this figure is expected to increase to 49 percent 
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and overtake the current leading economies by 2020.
94
 It is argued that 
rule-based governance largely relies on publicly verifiable information, 
while relationship-based governance largely relies on mutually observable 
information by involving transaction parties.
95
 From the discussion of the 
inefficient characteristics of corporate governance in emerging markets, it 
is clear that these defects are somehow the result of inefficient legal 
systems, either because of a lack of legislation or inefficient legal 
enforcement. In this part, some of the commonly applicable legal 
responses will be proposed, trying to address these joint problems shared 
by countries with emerging markets. Despite the fact that a rule-based 
governance system always involves large total fixed transaction costs, 
including cost of legislation, interpreting, and implementing laws by the 
legislative, judiciary and executive branches,
96
 the trend towards a rule-
oriented system is key for countries with emerging markets in which 
economic development is heavily hindered by widespread corruption and 
uncertainties.  
Compared to rule-based governance, the acquired information is 
implicit and specific for every transactional party, it is not publicly 
verifiable, and it is non-transferable.
97
 The controlling parties in network-
oriented corporate governance models control the information and make 
decisions, and these controlling powers make the information structure 
informal and centralized. The move towards an open, market-friendly, 
economically more democratic system for an emerging market requires a 
more functionally operated rule-based system of governance, which is 
more transparent, accountable and does not rely heavily on relationships.
98
 
A. Hybrid Regulatory Sources of Government Legislations and Soft Law 
It is argued that soft law has many advantages, including “timely action 
when governments are stalemated, bottom-up initiatives that bring 
additional legitimacy, expertise and other resources for making and 
 
 
 94. Sanjay Peters et al., How Relevant Is Corporate Governance and Corporate Social 
Responsibility in Emerging Markets?, 11 CORP. GOV. 429, 435 (2011). 
 95. George Baker et al., Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm, 117 Q.J. ECON. 39 
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enforcing new norms and standards and an effective means for direct civil 
society participation in global governance.”99 The role played by soft law 
is considered as a supporting role to enrich and strengthen the traditional 
legal instruments in the context of today’s globalized economies, dynamic 
and the complicated nature of corporate responsibility and corporate 
actions and constant but variable social needs.
100
 There are two broad 
regulatory mechanisms in corporate governance: government statutory 
legislations which regulate corporate behaviors, and standards of best 
practice which leave compliance to companies and are characterized by a 
comply-or-explain approach that enables companies to accomplish 
corporate goals that best fit their particular contingencies.
101
 International 
agencies including the OECD, the World Bank and the Asian 
Development Bank have already produced various guidelines and 
principles on corporate governance in order to press developing countries 
and emerging economies to adopt rule-based standards.
102
 Many countries 
have also promulgated corporate governance codes to which listed 
companies should adhere, based on the comply-or-explain principle.
103
 
Many of these codes are based on the OECD principle published in 
2004.
104
 Together with limited local legal reforms, globalization and the 
worldwide integration of financial markets are acting as the main drivers 
of this process.
105
 
 
 
 99. RENGINEE PILLAY, THE CHANGING NATURE OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: CSR 
AND DEVELOPMENT IN CONTEXT: THE CASE OF MAURITIUS 136 (2015). 
 100. Jon Birger Skjærseth, Olav Schram Stokke & Jørgen Wettestad, Soft Law, Hard Law, and 
Effective Implementation of International Environmental Norms, 6 GLOBAL ENVT’L POL. 104, 105–06 
(2006). 
 101. John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, What Is Corporate Law? in THE 
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Kraakman et al. eds., 2d ed. 2009). 
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set code of practice, but if it does not then it must state this in the annual directors’ report and explain 
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Regulatory Oversight, 34 LEGAL STUD. 279; Iain MacNeil & Xiao Li, “Comply or Explain”: Market 
Discipline and Non-Compliance with the Combined Code, 14 CORP. GOV.: AN INT’L REV. 486 (2006). 
 104. For research about codes and emerging markets, see Mathias M. Siems & Oscar Alvarez-
Macotela, The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets: A Successful 
Example of Networked Governance?, in THOMAS NETWORKED GOVERNANCE, TRANSNATIONAL 
BUSINESS AND THE LAW 257, 257 (Mark Fenwick, Steven Van Uytsel & Stefan Wrbka ed., 2014). 
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Corporate governance codes and other soft law refer to quasi-legal 
instruments without any penal and binding force, or with weaker binding 
force than traditional hard law.
106
 In relation to corporate governance, soft 
laws can be used in the context of voluntary principles that acquire 
recognition by companies, international financial institutions and civil 
societies as the result of an industry drive towards self-regulation, globally 
re-enforcing norms that have received multi-lateral and international 
acceptance.
107
 
Abbot and Snidal argue that “legal arrangements are weakened along 
one or more of the dimensions of obligation, precision, and delegation,” 
and that the softening can occur in varying degrees along each dimension 
and in different combinations across dimensions.
108
 Despite the fact that 
soft laws has been criticized for being mere window dressing,
109
 soft law 
offers many advantages and avoids some of the costs and impossibilities 
of hard law—and is often easier to achieve than legalization. Soft laws in 
place for dealing with corporate governance related issues have been 
useful in a number of places, especially on issues concerning corporate 
accountability, corporate transparency and CSR.
110
 A code of ethics is a 
guide that may be used both to regulate corporate behaviors and to create 
corporate ethical values in order to enhance corporate responsibilities 
towards stakeholders. These are soft laws which companies adhere to in a 
voluntary manner, above and beyond the legal requirements. The OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the Global Compact, the Norms 
on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and other Business 
with Regard to Human Rights,
111
 and other voluntary codes for corporate 
conduct have functioned as useful and influential documents for 
companies. Corporate governance codes from various countries with 
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INT’L ORG. 421, 422 (2000).  
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emerging markets also act as important legislative instruments to promote 
the efficiency and success of public companies.
112
  
The European Corporate Governance Institute provides an index of 
official corporate governance codes and principles from ninety-one 
countries as well as principles and guidelines from the OECD, the United 
Nations and Europe.
113
 Positively, more than half of these principles are 
from countries with emerging markets, including the Code for Corporate 
Governance for Bangladesh 2004, the Code of Best Practice of Corporate 
Governance (4th edition) 2009, the Code of Corporate Governance for 
Securities Companies (China) 2004, the Corporate Governance Code 
based on the OECD Principles 2004 (Czech Republic), the Code of 
Corporate Governance for Listed Companies 2001 (Egypt), the Corporate 
Governance Voluntary Guidelines 2009 (India), the Malaysian Code on 
Corporate Governance 2012, the Código de Mejores Prácticas 
Corporativas 2010, Corporate Governance Codes and Principles 2011 
(Nigeria), the Code of Best Practice for WSE Listed Companies (Poland), 
the Russian Code of Corporate Conduct 2002 (Russia), and the Principles 
of Good Corporate Governance for Listed Companies 2006 (Thailand). 
These corporate governance codes are regarded as soft-law and principles 
that offer guidance and rule for regulating listed companies. The adoption 
of a corporate governance code should raise funds in debt and equity 
market more efficiently for listed companies, resulting in a lower cost of 
capital and higher values for the companies.
114
 These codes normally focus 
on a few common aspects including boards of directors, shareholders and 
shareholders’ meetings, the rights of stakeholders, and information 
disclosure. These parts seem to tackle the problems listed in the first Part 
of this article, which are significant in emerging markets.
115
 The comply-
or-explain approach always acts as a start for transformations towards 
compulsory principles.
116
 Depending on the legal system and corporate 
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HHL CTR. CORP. GOVERNANCE & GLOBAL CORP. GOVERNANCE (2012), available at http://www.hhl. 
de/fileadmin/texte/publikationen/proceedings/Conference_Key_Corporate_Governance_Issues.pdf. 
 113. To access the index, see the European Corporate Governance Institute website, available at 
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/all_codes.php. 
 114. See generally Reform Priorities in Asia: Taking Corporate Governance to a Higher Level, 
OECD (2013). 
 115. See supra Part III, COMMON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DEFICIENCIES IN EMERGING 
MARKETS. 
 116. See, e.g., Gralf-Peter Calliess & Moritz Renner, From Soft Law to Hard Code: The 
Juridification of Global Governance (U. Bremen, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1030526##; Eryürekli Law Office, Turkey: Turkish Corporate Governance: 
Moving from Soft Law to Hard Law!, MONDAQ.COM (Jan. 13, 2012), http://www.mondaq.com/x/ 
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governance model development in each jurisdiction, a unique combination 
of compulsory rules and comply-or-explain guidelines and principles will 
work effectively to promote sound corporate governance. 
Corporate governance in emerging markets is different from mature 
markets in many ways, including national legalization, the enforceability 
of legislation, the consistency of enforcement, the applicability of stock 
market rules, and the level of national securities market development.
117
 
For emerging markets, more efficient regulatory frameworks could be 
established through a combination of hard laws, such as statutes and 
treaties, and soft laws, such as codes and principles which are nonbinding 
and less precise, and which rely on less centralized forms of interpretation 
and enforcement. The statutes and treaties will ensure the enforcement of 
corporate governance legislation. The soft laws, on the other hand, will 
provide flexibility to various corporate sectors in emerging markets which 
are older and less stable.  
B. Taking Positive Aspects of Government Interference and Incentives in 
Emerging Markets  
Heavy government intervention in business activities has been regarded 
as a common feature of emerging markets, which makes their corporate 
governance models differ from those in mature markets.
118
 Governments 
influence and control corporations through taxation, regulatory 
frameworks and share ownership, from output, including production 
process, to input such as labor, land, mines, energy and financing.
119
 Of 
these approaches, state investment in business corporations is probably the 
least desirable, because of its lower efficiency and higher pollution.
120
 
This interference has been normally regarded as a political hazard, 
together with issues such as political instability, unpredictable regulatory 
 
 
 117. Sanjay Peters, Mariah Miller & Sophia Kusyk, How Relevant is Corporate Governance 
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Enrico Perotti, From Government to Regulatory Governance: Privatization and the Residual Role of 
the State, 22 THE WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 53 (2007).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
476 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 15:447 
 
 
 
 
changes and bureaucratic red tape and corruption.
121
 Nevertheless, it may 
have positive impact on companies and corporate governance in emerging 
markets, especially by prompting an efficient model. Shleifer and Vishny 
took a dynamic view that “[c]orporate governance mechanisms are 
economic and legal institutions that can be altered through political 
process.”
122
 While a number of disadvantages of self-regulation have been 
noted, including conflicts of interest, inadequate sanctions, under-
enforcement, global competition and insufficient resources,
123
 it is argued 
that it is worth maintaining a balance between government regulation and 
self-regulation. Unlike the early path of internationalization for 
multinational corporations from mature and advanced markets
124
 and 
newly industrialized economies which already run under efficient market 
power, companies in emerging economies benefit tremendously by 
cooperating with governments. The non-subsidy assistance and control 
from state and government will help companies in fledgling industries in 
emerging economies and enable them to be more competitive in the 
globalized market. The concentration of political power can also 
potentially help corporate governance systems by enforcing soft law and 
government policy more efficiently, in order to ensure the transparency 
and accountability of corporate governance. The interference of 
government will mitigate the exclusive reliance on the market and regulate 
corporate behavior through direct and enforceable regulations.  
Despite the fact that the ultimate goal of SOEs should be to enhance 
economic performance and market integrity, often in emerging markets 
with SOEs the enterprises do have dual goals, including shareholder 
wealth maximization and political goals to promote political support and 
power,
125
 especially for SOEs in industries such as transportation, oil and 
gas, telecommunications and banking. The political economy literature 
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discussed that government and administrative agencies are typically 
serving multiple goals. Government interference may ease the pressure of 
the companies in pursuing shareholder value in the short-term and put the 
emphasis on the long-term value of the companies and the national goals 
at large.
126
 Government interference could be used as an additional 
governance mechanism mitigate conflicts such as those in the cases of 
company extension across community boundaries, secondary polices in 
public procurement and redundancies and reemployment to secured 
boarder social consensus. Thus, the interference could facilitate and 
shaping dynamic economic growth by establishing supportive business 
environment and introducing legislations that enable rather than hinder 
investors to set up companies as vehicle to do business or to trade in the 
stock exchanges in China. Government interference, supervision and 
control over these companies will secure the steady and harmonious 
development of the society. The political goals of SOEs in emerging 
economies are particularly important for guaranteeing public services at a 
competitive level. SOEs are able to achieve a combinative objective of 
national goals and corporate performance, setting a model for good 
compliance with the law and undertake social responsibility. It will be 
comparatively easier for them to take advantages of scientific technology 
to maintain a sustainable and effective business operational environment 
in order to achieve strategic goals of corporations in the longer terms.
127 
Most of the jurisdictions in emerging market are undergoing considerable 
corporate governance evolution but has yet to establish a unifying system 
that balances social-economic forces with the economy. 
It is s argued by Musacchio et al that government have improved 
corporate governance practices of SOEs, taking Sinopec (China’s national 
oil companies) as an example, on aspects of listing companies on stock 
exchanges, recruiting independent board members and enhancing financial 
reporting and these reforms have reduced agency conflicts and attracted 
minority private investors.
128
 In companies that the government outsources 
management to the private sector due to the reason of privatization and 
international investment, the State still has veto power over key strategic 
 
 
 126. David E. M. Sappington & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Privatization, Information, and Incentives, 6 J. 
POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 567 (1987). 
 127. Petronas, a SOE in Malaysia, is a good example of success as an industrial top quartile, 
which began an operational excellence campaign focusing on technical capabilities and more effective 
working cultural. See Petronas, 2009 SUSTAINABILITY REPORT, available at www.petronas.com.my/ 
sustainability/.../sustainability%20report2009.pdf. 
 128. Musacchio, Lazzarini & Aguilera, supra note 129, at 115. 
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decisions.
129
 The govenrment interference through different percentages of 
ownership will inevitably have an impact on the strategic planning in 
companies in China 
C. Legal Responses 
A weak legal environment and weak enforcement mechanisms will 
prevent the efficient allocation of resources and hinder global competition 
and economic development.
130
 Corporate governance reforms in emerging 
economies share certain collective characters by involving a transition 
from a close, opaque and relation-based governance model to a more open, 
transparent and rule-based governance system.
131
 Maher and Andersson 
discussed the important link between law and legal enforcement and the 
governance of firms, the economic performance of companies, and profit 
growth.
132
 More sound corporate governance models generally pay for 
better companies, more mature markets and better national economies. In 
the last decade, countries with emerging markets have introduced reforms 
and changes at different levels in their legal systems. Taking South Korea 
as an example, a series of reforms have been introduced in responses to the 
Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s in order to establish more effective 
internal and external control mechanisms, such as transparent management 
and excessive expansion since.
133
 As for the legal reform proposal in 
capital market law and regulation, changes or proposed changes can be 
classified into the following categories. The first legal response that is 
normally introduced to counter corporate governance weakness is to 
enable board structure reform. Boards constitute a key internal governance 
mechanism. It is argued that there is a strong connection between board 
 
 
 129. Id. at 116 
 130. Christoph Lattemann, On the Convergence of Corporate Governance Practices in Emerging 
Markets, 9 INT’L L.J. EMERGING MKTS. 316, 317 (2014); see also Simeon Djankov et al., The Law and 
Economics of Self-dealing, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 430, 436 (2008). 
 131. Charles Oman, Steven Fries & Willem Buiter, Corporate Governance in Developing, 
Transition and Emerging-Market Economies, OECD DEV. CTR. POL’Y BRIEF NO. 23 9 (2003). 
 132. Maria Maher & Thomas Andersson, Corporate Governance Effects on Firm Performance 
and Economic Growth, (Paris, OECD Publ’ing 1999); see also Thorsten Beck & Ross Levine, Legal 
Institutions and Financial Development, in HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 251, 269 
(Claude Menard & Mary Shirley eds., 2005). 
 133. See SWATI R. GHOSH, WORLD BANK, EAST ASIAN FINANCE: THE ROAD TO ROBUST 
FINANCIAL MARKETS 67 (2006); Curtis J. Milhaupt, Privatization and Corporate Governance in a 
Unified Korea, 26 J. CORP. L. 199 (2000–2001); Bernard Black, Barry Metzger, Timothy J. O’Brien, 
Young Moo Shin, Corporate Governance in Korea at the Millennium: Enhancing International 
Competitiveness—Final Report and Legal Reform Recommendations to the Ministry of Justice of the 
Republic of Korea, 26 J. Corp. L. 537 (2000–2001).  
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structure and the market value of companies operating in emerging 
markets.
134
 Suggested reforms include a mandatory requirement for 
independent outsiders on the board, or employee representatives on the 
board.
135
  
Second, reforms are always introduced regarding directors’ duties; the 
legislation dealing with directors’ duties should be comprehensively 
developed. Their fiduciary duties should be more clearly defined by 
legislation in emerging markets. Examining English Law for reference, 
duties are traditionally drawn from two broad non-statutory sources, and 
are manifest as fiduciary duties and expectations drawn from common 
law.
136
 The fiduciary duties emphasize the need for trustworthiness and the 
essence of acting in the best interests of the company, while the common 
law expectation is concerned with ensuring that directors exercise 
reasonable care and show requisite skill and diligence.
137
 An occupant 
with fiduciary duties was defined by Lord Justice Millett in Bristol & West 
Building Society v. Mothew as “someone who has undertaken to act for or 
on behalf of another in a particular matter in a circumstance which gives 
rise to a relationship of trust and confidence.”
138
 In the case of a company, 
since directors have complete power and management responsibility over 
the company and the company’s assets, they should indisputably be 
fiduciaries.
139
 Fiduciary duties to which directors are subject include: the 
 
 
 134. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black & Woochan Kim, The Effect of Board Structure on Firm Value: a 
Multiple Identification Strategy Approach Using Korean Data, 104 J. FIN. ECON. 203, 203 (2012); 
Gongmeng Chen et al., Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance, and Fraud: Evidence from 
China, 12 J. CORP. FIN. 424, 426 (2006); Agnes W.Y. Lo et al., Can Corporate Governance Deter 
Management from Manipulation Earning? Evidence from Related-party Sales Transactions in China, 
16 J. CORP. FIN. 225, 226 (2010); Beverley Jackling & Shireenjit Johl, Board Structure and Firm 
Performance: Evidence from India’s Top Companies, 17 CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L REV. 492, 
495 (2009). 
 135. Kenneth Scott, The Role of Corporate Governance in South Korea Economic Reform, 4 J. 
APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8 (1998); Jill Solomon, Aris Solomon & Chang–Young Park, A Conceptual 
Framework for Corporate Governance Reform in South Korea, 10 CORP. GOV.: INT’L REV. 29 (2002); 
Craig Ehrlich & Dae-Seob Kang, U.S. Style Corporate Governance in Korea’s Largest Companies, 18 
UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1 (2000); Bernard Black, Barry Metzger, Timothy J. O’Brien & Shin, Moo 
Young, Corporate Governance in Korea at the Millennium: Enhancing International 
Competitiveness—Final Report and Legal Reform Recommendations to the Ministry of Justice of the 
Republic of Korea, 26 J. CORP. L. 537 (2000–2001). 
 136. See ANDREW KEAY, DIRECTORS’ DUTIES, CH. 4 (2d ed. 2014); Lionel Smith, Fiduciary 
Relationship: Ensuring the Loyal Exercise of Judgment on Behalf of Another, 130 L. Q. R. 608 (2014); 
Ernest Lim, Directors’ Fiduciary Duties: A New Analytical Framework, 129 L.Q. R. 242 (2013). 
 137. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 174(1) (Eng.). 
 138. Bristol & W. Bldg. Soc’y v. Mothew [1997] 2 W.L.R. 436 (C.A. 1996). 
 139. Paul D. Finn, The Fiduciary Principle, in EQUITY, FIDUCIARIES, AND TRUSTS 1, 33 (T.G. 
Youdan ed., 1989); Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v. Gulliver, [1967] 2 A.C. 134 (H.L. 1942) (appeal taken 
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duty to act bona fide (in good faith)
140
 for the interest of the company and 
not for other collateral purposes,
141
 the duty that a director must not put 
himself in a position where there is an actual or potential conflict between 
his personal interests and his duty to the company,
142
 and the duty not to 
make secret personal profit from any opportunity resulting from their 
positions, even if they are acting honestly and for the good of the 
company.
143
 
Logically, another question that arises in terms of reform suggestions 
for directors’ duties is to whom these duties are owed. Again, taking 
English Law as a positive example for reference, in general, directors’ 
duties are owed to the company as a whole and not to individual 
members.
144
 However, directors’ duties may be enlarged and extended 
beyond general principles in certain circumstances when considering the 
interests of wider audiences such as employees,
145
 creditors,
146
 individual 
shareholders
147
 and so forth. Corporate responsibilities including ethical, 
social, workforce, environmental and even philanthropic concerns have to 
be included in the corporate management agenda as the result of the 
enforcement of Section 172 of the Companies Act 2006, in which the 
enlightened shareholder value principle was enshrined, along with 
increasing pressure to take account of companies’ social responsibilities. 
Due to the fact that the principle itself is still a subject of controversy in 
the UK, it might not be logical or reasonable to give a definite answer 
about the validity and effectiveness of the adoption of such an approach in 
company law for directors’ duties in emerging markets. However, it is 
important to integrate this legislative attitude into the provisions regarding 
directors’ duties in order to enforce CSR more efficiently, and it will be a 
positive legislative step for governments in emerging markets to include 
 
 
 140. In re Smith & Fawcett Ltd. [1942] Ch. 304 (C.A. 1942); In re W & M Roith Ltd. [1967] 1 
W.L.R. 432 (Ch. 1966); J.J. Harrison (Props.) Ltd. v. Harrison, 2001 WL 1135159 (C.A. 2001). 
 141. For directors using their power to raising capital for other purposes, see Punt v. Symons & 
Co. Ltd. [1903] 2 Ch. 506 (Ch. 1903) and Hogg v. Cramphorn Ltd. [1967] Ch. 254 (Ch. 1963) for 
directors using their power to raising capital for other purposes. 
 142. See Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 175 (Eng.) for description on avoiding conflict of 
interests; see also Aberdeen Ry. Co. v. Blaikie Bros. [1854] 17 D. (H.L.) 20; Knight v. Frost & Ors 
[1999] B.C.C. 819 (Ch. 1998); Ball v. Eden Project Ltd., 2001 WL 273005 (EWHC 2011); Bhullar v. 
Bhullar, 2003 WL 1202661 (C.A. 2003). 
 143. See Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v. Gulliver [1967] 2 A.C. 134 (H.L. 1942) (appeal taken from 
Eng.); Gencor ACP Ltd. v. Dalby, 2000 WL 1881279 (EWHC 2000). 
 144. See Percival v. Wright [1902] 2 Ch. 421 (Ch. 1902); Peskin v. Anderson [2000] BCC 1110 
(Ch. 1999).  
 145. See Hutton v. W. Cork Rwy. Co. [1883] 23 Ch. D. 654 (C.A.). 
 146. See Lonrho Ltd v. Shell Petroleum Co Ltd [1981] 2 All E.R. 456, [1980] 1 W.L.R. 627. 
 147. See Allen v Hyatt [1914] 30 T.L.R. 444. 
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various stakeholders’ interests in the directors’ fiduciary duties. It would 
be sensible to remind directors that as well as the interests of shareholders, 
they also have to consider the interests of other constituencies who are part 
of the company and have certain claims, either fixed or residual, on the 
corporations’ profits. 
Third, mandatory information disclosure on both financial aspects and 
non-financial issues such as environmental matters, company employees 
and social and community issues will also greatly enhance the efficiency 
of corporate governance in emerging markets. Information disclosure at a 
mandatory level is one part of a combination that makes corporate 
responsibilities towards various constituencies possible and enforceable. 
Beattie and McInnes argue that mandatory rules will help to produce 
narrative disclosures of a higher quality, which will lead to an increase in 
the amount of disclosure and reduce variability by an absolute amount 
attributable to the size of the company.
148
 While the reporting system is 
still underdeveloped, it is necessary to further enhance sustainability 
reporting and CSR reports in a more enforceable manner, adopting a more 
systematic and standardized format in comparison with traditional 
economic reporting.
149
 Europe is a good example, where CSR-related 
information disclosure requirements under the existing framework are 
applicable to both listed and other types of companies. The Transparency 
Directive regulates the ongoing periodic disclosure of listed companies, 
making it mandatory for companies to draw up their annual reports (or 
management reports for listed companies) in accordance with the 
provisions of the accounting company law directives concerning annual 
reports.
150
 The Modernization Directive modifies the company law 
directive on annual accounts, making the disclosure of certain non-
financial key performance indicators mandatory under EU law, including 
an annual report on environmental and employee issues.
151
 Looking at a 
 
 
 148. VIVIEN BEATTIE & BILL MCINNES, NARRATIVE REPORTING IN THE UK AND THE US—
WHICH SYSTEM WORKS BEST? 15 (2006). 
 149. Ataur Rahman Belal & Vasily Lubinin, Corporate Social Disclosure (CSD) in Russia, in 
GLOBAL PRACTICE OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 165, 165 (Samuel O. Idowu & Walter 
Leal Filho eds., 2008). 
 150. Directive 2004/109/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004 
on the Harmonization of Transparency Requirements in Relation to Information About Issuers Whose 
Securities Are Admitted to Trading on a Regulated Market and Amending Directive 2001/34/EC, art. 
4, 2004 O.J. (L390) 38, 45. 
 151. See Directive 2003/51/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2003 
Amending Directives 78/660/EEC, 83/349/EEC, 86/635/EEC and 91/674/EEC on the Annual and 
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Insurance Undertakings, 2003 O.J. (L178) 16, 20. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
482 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 15:447 
 
 
 
 
regulatory perspective, it is crucial that while the EU initially shied away 
from mandatory regulation in relation to CSR, it embraced indirect 
encouragement in the form of a non-financial reporting requirement 
applicable to large scale undertakings in 2014. Predicated as a regulatory 
driver for transparent corporate engagement with sustainability within the 
EU, mandatory narrative reporting will be introduced as a means to 
implement the Directive on Non-Financial Information and Diversity 
Information (“the Non-Financial Reporting Directive”).152 The 
introduction of mandatory sustainability reporting and the enforcement 
and practice of this information disclosure requirement can be 
contextualised with a broader EU regulatory focus concerning corporate 
governance matters. The adoption of similar mandatory requirements will 
promote the transparency and accountability of corporate governance in 
emerging markets. Positively, corporate law related reform in China has 
set a progressive example. The current business inspection system was 
changed in February 2014. Instead, an annual reporting system will be 
introduced in China with annual reports open to public inspection.
153
 
Fourth, the legitimacy of cross-listing by having access to foreign 
capital markets has been widely recognized as an incentive to improve 
corporate governance.
154
 Cross-listing securities is an efficient way to 
access international financial markets and is always related to improved 
corporate governance practices in a stronger investment environment with 
higher requirements for information disclosure and corporate governance 
rules.
155
 Voluntarily embracing the stronger regulatory regimes may also 
help companies to improve their corporate governance. Soft laws, 
including regulations for stock exchanges and corporate governance codes 
required by the host exchange, may also help.
156
 As far as companies in 
emerging markets are concerned, the cross-listing through American 
Depositary Receipts programs is associated with more cross-border flows 
 
 
 152. Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of October 22, 2014, 
amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by 
certain large undertakings and groups OJ L 330/1. Member States must introduce the non-financial 
reporting regime by December 6, 2016. 
 153. Notice of the State Administration for Industry and Commerce on Ceasing the Annual 
Enterprise Inspection (State Administration for Industry and Commerce, 2014) (Lawinfochina) 
(China). 
 154. Rene M. Stulz, Globalization, Corporate Finance, and the Cost of Capital, 12 J. APPLIED 
CORP. FIN. 8 (1999). 
 155. John C. Coffee, Do Norms Matter? A Cross-Country Evaluation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2151 
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http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol15/iss3/6
  
 
 
 
 
2016] CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 483 
 
 
 
 
and greater integration in globalized capital markets.
157
 South Korea is a 
good example of enhanced cross-listing, where listed companies are given 
the option to cross-list in nine foreign stock markets, including NESE, 
NASDAQ, AMEX, and stock markets in London, Frankfurt, Paris, Tokyo, 
Hong Kong and Singapore, as part of the country’s modernization, 
globalization and convergent corporate governance practice. It is argued 
that cross-listing, as a form of regional market integration scheme, will 
facilitate and enhance competition among stock exchanges, including 
competition for more sound regulatory framework between the home 
market and the host market, and/or harmonization and convergence as a 
result.
158
 This is particularly important for internationalization of 
corporate governance scheme in emerging market for the reason that the 
stock markets in emerging market have remained effectively isolated 
despite the rapid integration of economy into the world system in the areas 
such as international trade, globalization of capital markets, corporate 
governance convergence.
159
  
Fifth, effective auditing and an independent external auditor will help 
safeguard to protect accounting information and ensure fairer and more 
efficient corporate governance. Independent auditors are expected to be 
neutral and free from all influence, either directly or indirectly, from those 
affected by their work. An auditor required “to be free from situations and 
relationships which would make it probable that a reasonable and 
informed third party would conclude that the auditor’s objectivity is either 
impaired or could be impaired.”
160
 The relationship between boards of 
directors and shareholders gives rise to an agency problem, and financial 
statements verified by independent auditors are prepared to ensure 
corporate governance accountability and to promote efficiency in 
corporate governance. For example, it is argued that problems arising from 
concentrated ownership can be mitigated by effective auditing.
161
 This is 
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J. KOREAN L. 1, 13 (2003). 
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(2015). 
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regarded one of the most important issues, especially after the collapse of 
the Enron Company and others in the United State during the early years 
of this century, and legislations or proposals for legislation have been 
introduced or suggested for regulatory purposes.
162
 As the result of these 
scandals, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was introduced in the US to ensure 
successful auditing and management. “Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on Specific Requirements 
Regarding Statutory Audit of Public Interests Entity 2011,” is another 
good example of legal responses to corporate scandals or financial crisis, 
this case based on the experience of the financial crisis which began in 
2008.
163
 Related legislative experience in emerging markets is far from 
competent, while issues of independence have always been ignored.  
Lastly, a more efficient derivative claim action should be embedded in 
corporate law to protect the interests of minority shareholders in order to 
achieve fairer corporate governance mechanisms in emerging markets. 
Derivative action is an exception to the rule in proper plaintiff rule and 
majority rule in company law.
164
 If a shareholder can establish that the 
action harming the company constitutes a fraud on the minority and that 
the wrongdoers control the company, he or she will be permitted to take 
derivative proceedings which are derived from the company.
165
 The 
 
 
 162. See JOHN C. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 32–
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AFTER ENRON, IMPROVING CORPORATE LAW AND MODERNIZING SECURITIES REGULATION IN 
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(2003). 
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 164. See Foss v. Harbottle [1843] 2 Hare 461; Kenneth W. Wedderburn, Shareholders’ Rights and 
the Rule in Foss v. Harbottle, 16 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 194 (1957); A.J. BOYLE, MINORITY 
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under the Companies Act 2006, 124 L.Q. REV. 469 (2008). 
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system is designed to overcome certain inadequacies of common law in 
the area of shareholder remedies, including the prohibitive cost of 
litigation, the restrictive standing requirement, and the uncertainties of the 
rule and exceptions.
166
 Statutory derivative action is designed to make the 
rule more practical and feasible,
167
 and it has been adopted in jurisdictions 
such as the UK,
168
 Australia,
169
 Canada
170
 and New Zealand.
171
 It is 
widely accepted that the derivative action rule has a number of functions 
which can facilitate the development of a more sound corporate 
governance system, in particular by deterring directors from misusing their 
power by holding them accountable for their misconduct.
172
 The system is 
related to the control of the corporate form in which plaintiff shareholders 
theoretically act in the collective interests of all shareholders, employing a 
legal mechanism to address the agency problem between the directors and 
the shareholders. In emerging markets where the agent-principal problem 
and principal-principal conflict are equally important, private enforcement 
of shareholder action will provide an alternative to regulating and 
controlling corporate conduct.
173
 The derivative claim system, together 
with the statutory derivative claim rule, plays a fundamental part in 
aligning the interests of directors and shareholders which makes the 
system work coherently with the other five legal reform proposals 
suggested here to promote corporate governance efficiency and 
competitiveness in emerging markets.  
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V. PATH DEPENDENCE THEORY AND THE UNIQUENESS OF ENFORCING 
LEGAL RESPONSES IN INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES WITH EMERGING MARKETS 
As Coffee states, “corporate governance is more than simply a 
technology”;
174
 it is “infused with politics and shaped by history; it is not 
a variable that a firm can simply elect or contract around.”
175
 Path 
dependence, a comparatively new theory originating in the 1980s, suggests 
“that an outcome or decision is shaped in specific and systematic ways by 
the historical path leading to it,” as well as by other factors within the 
socio-economic context.
176
 The theory of path dependence attributes 
national differences in corporate law and corporate governance models to 
the divergent historical and social underpinnings of different jurisdictions. 
The insight of path dependence is captured by Moore and Lewis, who state 
that “the lesson of history . . . is that while markets have always been 
there, they have always operated in the context of geography, religion, 
language, folk ways, families, armies, and government, never in a 
vacuum.”
177
 While convergence theorists predict that countries, especially 
countries with weak legal systems, will adopt certain legal rules that have 
been demonstrably efficient in other jurisdictions, theorists who adhere to 
path dependence normally argue that divergence will still exist because 
legal rules are shaped by pre-existing political and social forces.
178
 In 
many ways, “the law is in thrall to history and not merely as a matter of 
judicial psychology.”
179
 
Path dependence theory can be regarded as a theoretical base for the 
adoption of a series of reform suggestions proposed in this article, with 
unique national characteristics shaping a particular country’s corporate 
governance model, corporate law background, enforcement process, 
shareholder structure, civil procedure law, and stage of economic 
development. Since a variety of economic, social and political factors help 
to explain why corporate governance in emerging markets has become an 
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increasingly prominent theme in business, academic and policy circles, 
path dependence related factors have a big impact on shaping corporate 
governance in countries with emerging markets, and sometimes even 
make corporate governance models unique. It has been argued by Bebchuk 
and Roe that the initial ownership structure in a country will directly 
influence the subsequent development of ownership structure and laws.
180
 
They developed path dependence theory to suggest that the interested 
parties possessing the power to influence ownership structure and 
corporate law will have both the incentive and the power to impede 
changes that might improve efficiency, but which are contrary to their 
private control interests.
181
 
Path dependence theorists argue in favor of this disparity using legal, 
political and cultural variables. There are hundreds of legal systems 
around the world, and researchers always group them by legal families 
based on criteria such as the geography, language, official ideology and 
religion. The two main legal families are the common law world and civil 
law system.
182
 Within emerging markets, for example, Bangladesh, 
Pakistan and India belong to the common law family, while Brazil, China, 
the Czech Republic, Russia and Turkey are civil law countries. The legal 
origin of laws is regarded as the primary factor that affects almost all other 
variables that have an impact on corporate governance.
183
 Apart from the 
legal origins, corporate governance systems in each emerging market 
jurisdictions also vary in the context of the widespread diffusion of 
regulatory agencies. These agencies always have the triple roles of 
regulator, promoter and supervisor. Their roles are always unique in each 
jurisdiction, depending on the shareholding structure and the degree of 
government interference in listed companies. Roe argued that political 
factors are key for differing ownership structure and corporate governance 
models.
184
 Peter Gourevitch also suggests a link between political 
 
 
 180. Lucian Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Governance 
and Ownership, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 139 (2000). 
 181. Id. at 132. 
 182. Hamadi Matoussi & Maha Khemakhem Jardak, International Corporate Governance and 
Finance: Legal, Culture and Political Explanations, 47 INT’L J. ACCT. 1, 5 (2012) 
 183. See Rafael LaPorta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership 
around the World, 54 J. FINANCE 471(1999); Rafael LaPorta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei 
Shleifer, & Robert Vishny, Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2000); 
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The Economic Consequences of Legal 
Origins, 46 J. ECON. LIT. 285 (2008). 
 184. MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: POLITICAL 
CONTEXT, CORPORATE IMPACT (2003); MARK J. ROE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: POLITICAL AND 
LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (2005); Mark J. Roe & Jordan I. Siegel, Political Instability: Its Effects on 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
488 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 15:447 
 
 
 
 
mechanisms, corporate governance and share ownership, interest group 
preference and cross-class coalitions between shareholders, directors and 
employees on the one hand, and political institutions including electoral 
law, legislative-executive relations and the number of political parties on 
the other.
185
 Obviously, these political elements differ dramatically 
between countries with emerging markets. However, the central element in 
the political impact of the regulation of corporate governance lies in the 
differing extent to which the political climate of a jurisdiction is conducive 
to the pursuit of shareholder wealth and market-oriented policies.
186
 This 
also has an impact on different legislative philosophies of corporate law in 
terms of directors’ duties and mandatory information disclosure for 
stakeholder protection. 
Amir Licht is in the top tier in terms of developing the cross-cultural 
theory of the role of culture in the development of corporate governance 
and financial regulation.
187
 Cultural elements including ethnicity, customs, 
beliefs, shared values, and religion are regarded as primary factors that 
affect effective systems of corporate governance.
188
 For example, the 
impact of guanxi and renqing in China will make the related corporate 
governance reform different from that in other emerging markets.
189
 The 
Confucian philosophy has a wide impact in defining the corporate 
governance agenda in China, South Korea and Japan.
190
 The strongly 
authorized cultural embeddedness and hierarchy in Eastern European 
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countries that endured Communist rule are also rooted in those 
jurisdictions. Another example from a cultural perspective is a growing 
concern regarding the Islamic principles of corporate governance in 
proving justice, honest and fairness to ensure all parties, shareholders and 
other stakeholders in corporations receive their rights and dues.
191
 As 
emerging markets becoming more important as dominating economies for 
inward investors from developed economies, these non-business elements 
may also influence the behavior of foreign MNCs in emerging markets.  
National corporate governance systems exhibit significant variation in 
terms of the appointment of national regulatory agencies and civil 
servants, legal impediments for removing regulatory officials, the finance 
and staffing of regulatory agencies, and the execution of power authorized 
by law to overturn decisions made by regulators.
192
 This variation is 
particularly distinct in emerging markets with SOEs and regulatory 
agencies at different levels. Civil servants act as directors, and regulations 
and guidelines are produced by agencies with unclear authorities. As part 
of the domestic legal and financial framework, a corporate law system has 
significant sources of path dependence, which include historical accidents 
as well as economic and political particulars of the domestic system.
193
 
The persistence of these sources significantly contributes to the stability of 
the domestic corporate governance system in any local socio-economic 
environment. Path dependence is an important phenomenon in law, and 
evidence of this is that the convergence of legal systems is much slower 
than the convergence of technology and economic institutions.
194
 
Therefore, in terms of legal responses to corporate governance problems in 
emerging markets, the strategy of legal reform is not to “create an ideal set 
of rules and then see how they can be enforced, but rather to enact the 
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rules that can be enforced with the existing enforcement structure.”
195
 It 
has been argued that principles of good and effective corporate governance 
are converging while variations in national company law and practice 
remain in accordance with the path dependence theory.
196
 For applicable 
and sound corporate governance principles for emerging markets, this 
should be also be the case, if not even more so. Therefore, in spite of the 
common problems of corporate governance and reform suggestions for 
emerging markets, the ways of accommodating these reform suggestions 
in legislation will always depend on the history, culture, tradition and legal 
enforcement of a country. Even the legal reform suggestions that have 
been given largely depend on experiences from best practice in convergent 
sound corporate governance models, but the enforcement will be a unique 
process in every jurisdiction. Jacques tried to change some common 
prejudices from the Western world about China, for example by noting: 
“even if China moves in the direction of a more representative government 
and a more independent judiciary, as it probably will in the long term, it 
will surely do so in very much its own way, based on its own history and 
traditions, which will owe little or nothing to any Western inheritance.”
197
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
At the level of the corporation, the importance of corporate governance 
for access to financing, valuation, the cost of capital and performance has 
been documented in various disciplines, using a variety of methodologies 
for countries with emerging markets, especially BRICs. It is not arguable 
that more sound corporate governance will lead to higher returns on equity 
and greater efficiency. The reform proposals described above were driven 
by forces including more sound corporate governance standards, more 
proficient investor protection, developed corporate law and securities 
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regulation, and economically, socially and politically sustainable 
development. This article approached the issue of corporate governance in 
emerging markets from the viewpoint that the deficiencies of corporate 
governance in those jurisdictions can be promoted and enhanced in 
common legal reform proposals. However, this stance is prompted by the 
argument put forward by path dependence theorists that corporate 
governance regimes and the corporate law development of each 
jurisdiction with an emerging market is a product of its own heritage and 
value system, which is entrenched in a unique way of thinking and 
interwoven into its cultural identity. It is a mistake to measure efficiencies 
of corporate governance in emerging market in terms of a developed 
Western yardstick because the heritage and value systems of those 
jurisdictions are deeply entrenched in a unique way of thinking and 
individual cultural entities. The recent experience of the global financial 
crisis in 2008 and the Euro-zone crisis have exposed shortcomings and 
problems in the Western model and in rule-oriented rather than 
relationship-oriented corporate governance.
198
 However, these failures that 
shook the economies of developing countries have also drawn attention to 
the weak corporate governance in emerging markets, especially in terms of 
raising capital and attracting foreign investors.  
The relationship between corporate governance, legal enforcement, 
economic growth and the efficiency of investment allocation has been 
discussed in relation to emerging markets. According to the World 
Investment Report 2005, of the top six most attractive global business 
locations, five are emerging economies, including China, India, Russia, 
Brazil, and Mexico.
199
 It is noted in the article that emerging markets tend 
to have weaker corporate governance systems. From this discussion, the 
author agrees that emerging markets are characterized by “an absence of 
norms, values of business standards caused by turbulent socio-economic 
and political conditions and with a weak legal system.”
200
 Companies in 
emerging markets are challenged by the markets’ poor reputations and 
 
 
 198. Kun Luen Alex Lau & Angus Young, Why China Shall Not Completely Transit from a 
Relation Based Governance Regime: A Chinese Perspective, 21 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: AN 
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW 577, 583 (2013); for arguments in favor of rule-based corporate governance 
systems in emerging markets, see Charles Oman, Steven Fries and Willem Buiter, Corporate 
Governance in Developing, Transition and Emerging-Market Economies, OECD 8–10 (2003), 
http://willembuiter.com/oecd.pdf. 
 199. UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2005 (2005), http://unctad.org/en/Docs/wir2005_en.pdf. 
 200. Sanjay Peters, Mariah Miller & Sophia Kusyk, How Relevant is Corporate Governance 
Corporate Social Responsibility in Emerging Markets, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INTERNATIONAL 
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS IN SOCIETY 429, 233 (2011). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
492 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 15:447 
 
 
 
 
their lack of accountability and transparency in terms of corporate 
governance. This article opens a new avenue for future development in 
emerging markets, especially from legal aspects. Focusing on corporate 
governance problems arising from state ownership, state control, board 
independence, and poor stakeholder and minority shareholder protection, 
several proposals were made at different levels. From a more generalized 
point of view, hybrid regulatory sources from government legislations and 
soft laws, including guidelines and regulations from government 
departments and agencies, were suggested as appropriate for emerging 
markets. Logically, these hybrid regulatory sources lead to a discussion of 
the positive impact of government intervention in the regulation of listed 
companies in emerging markets. At a more specific level in the corporate 
law domain, a series of elements were suggested, although they may 
already have been enforced individually in certain jurisdictions, including 
independent directors, employee representatives, more clearly-defined 
directors’ duties (especially their duties toward stakeholders), mandatory 
information disclosure on CSR issues, legitimacy of cross-listing, effective 
auditing, and the appointment of independent external auditors, in order to 
promote corporate governance in emerging markets and facilitate 
responses to inefficiencies in emerging markets. These necessary measures 
should be taken to improve the enforcement and application of reform 
principles and rules in order to accomplish a full and successful reform. 
The author also recognizes that a one-size-fits-all approach to corporate 
governance will not work for countries with emerging markets. It is 
discussed that these legal reform proposals and standards will achieve 
most of the goals for the improvement of domestic corporate governance if 
they are adopted and enforced with a consideration for the market, laws, 
culture, history and governmental institutions that exist in the specific 
economy. There is an urgent need for countries with emerging markets to 
promote effective corporate governance rules and regulations, as well as to 
ensure the effective enforcement of these rules if they are to be 
competitive globally, using successful experiences and information to 
make their systems stronger and more efficient.  
The BRICs have become an eminent economic force, and generally 
speaking, emerging economies have taken a large share of world trade in 
the last two decades. It is predicted that BRICs, particularly China and 
India but together with other countries with emerging markets, will 
continue their rise, while global economic patterns will continue to change 
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geo-politically.
201
 With promising economic growth but a lack of strong, 
long-established financial institutions, infrastructure and securities 
markets, corporate governance with more efficient enforcement of 
corporate law and securities regulations is key for these countries. 
Emerging markets, compared with mature markets, face additional hurdles 
due to their lack of institutional memory and experience from boards of 
directors in these countries.
202
 
In the 1980s and 1990s, as the result of the “Washington 
Consensus,”
203
 countries with emerging markets undertook legal and 
orthodox macro-economic policy reforms to mitigate the impacts of state 
intervention in the economy and subject most firms to greater 
competition.
204
 The privatization process was one of the most informative 
policy reforms of the business organizational environment in emerging 
markets at the time.
205
 The advent and spread of this significant economic 
transformations, namely the privatization carried out through the creation 
of new regulatory institutions.
206
 Many legal proposals in corporate law 
and employment law have been enforced to secure the smooth running of 
this policy change. After a few decades, corporate governance changes 
continue to be a key driver for a more competitive economy and 
sustainable development. This article highlights the importance of good 
corporate governance and its impact on share price and the liquidity of 
capital markets. Legal responses to corporate governance problems were 
discussed and categorized. Transparency, board independence, and a 
separate audit committee are emphasized in the article to promote 
respectful corporate governance principles.  
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